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THE COST OF COERCION:
IS THERE A PLACE FOR “HARD” INTERVENTIONS
IN COPYRIGHT LAW?
Yifat Nahmias
ABSTRACT—The contractual relationship between author and
intermediary—be it a producer, publisher, or anyone facilitating the
commercial exploitation of the author’s copyrighted works—is often
viewed as an unequal one. Other than a minority of superstars, the vast
majority of authors are forced to accept contractual terms dictated by their
powerful counterparties. This outcome is perceived by many scholars and
policymakers as undesirable. Thus, in an effort to protect the authors’
wellbeing in their contractual dealings, legislatures from around the world
are increasingly keen to adopt regulatory measures that limit the menu of
options the parties can adopt contractually. Specifically, these instruments
endeavor to offset author’s weak bargaining position either by ensuring a
minimum level of remuneration to authors’ ex-ante or providing them with
an inalienable right to ask for a modification of the com-sensation
stipulated in the contract ex-post or by granting them an inalienable right to
regain control of their previously transferred rights. Overall, these
legislative interventions are seemingly based on the assumption that
regulating author-intermediary transactions ex ante and ex post will
invariably improve the financial situation of authors as a whole. This
assumption is mistaken.
Drawing on insights from neoclassical and behavioral economics, the
benefits and drawbacks of these interventions are narrated throughout this
paper. It is further demonstrated that while these legislative interventions
were adopted with the best possible intentions, they ultimately prove
ineffective in meeting their own objective of securing authors a more

Postdoctoral Research Fellow, the Center for Cyber, Law & Policy (CCLP), Haifa University. This
paper is drawn, in part, from my doctoral dissertation written under the supervision of Prof. Gideon
Parchomovsky at Bar-Ilan University, Faculty of Law. I am grateful to Prof. Gideon Parchomovsky for
his invaluable advice and guidance and Dr. Miriam Bitton-Marchovitch for her comments and
suggestions. I also thank Bar Atrakchi and Dr. Avi Osterman for valuable observations and comments
on earlier drafts. Special thanks are also due to the participants of the Ph.D. Colloquium at Bar-Ilan
University, Faculty of Law. All errors or omissions are the sole responsibility of the Author.

155

NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

favorable distribution of wealth. In fact, they occasionally harm the very
group of beneficiaries they were designed to help. Particularly, the different
forms of interventions into the author-intermediary contractual
relationships create an inter-author redistribution of wealth and
redistribution over time, which largely harm the most vulnerable groups of
authors. These findings illustrate the limitations of the current legislative
interventions that were designed to strengthen the position of authors vis-àvis their counterparties and emphasize that the structural disparities in
bargaining powers cannot be easily remedied by legal intervention alone.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

The author’s financial wellbeing is a central concern of the copyright
system. For this reason, copyrights are generally vested initially with the
author.1 Granting the author a bundle of exclusive property rights does not
1 There is no doubt that categorizing copyrights as property rights is a normative decision. Indeed,
one of the most debated questions in the copyright literature is whether copyright is or should be
property rights. Nevertheless, for present purposes it is enough to note that the prevailing narrative in
almost all jurisdictions refers to copyrights as property rights. For a detailed discussion of the property
debate, see, e.g., Julie E. Cohen, Copyright as Property in the Post-Industrial Economy: A Research
Agenda, 2011 WISC. L. REV. 141 (2011); Richard Epstein, Liberty versus Property—Cracks in the
Foundations of Copyright Law, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1 (2005); Stewart Sterk, Intellectualizing
Property: The Tenuous Connections between Land and Copyright, 83 WASH. U.L. Q. 417 (2005); Sara
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guarantee pecuniary rewards, but it does create a legal institution that
performs a set of social and economic functions related to the management
of creative works, which authors can use to elicit monetary or nonmonetary compensation.2 However, authors are rarely in a position to
engage in the commercial exploitation of their work. As a result, these
rights are commonly transferred to an entity better positioned to maximize
the commercial value of the work—an intermediary.3
Problem is, authors are generally in a weaker bargaining position
relative to their counterparties, resulting in bargaining outcomes that often
heavily favor the intermediary.4 Therefore, specific measures purporting to
protect the authors’ wellbeing in their contractual dealings have been
implemented through the copyright laws of the United States, Israel, and
multiple European countries.5
One specific category of these author-protectionist measures are at the
heart of this paper, namely those I term “hard interventions”.6 Hard
interventions aimed to redress the disparities in bargaining power between
authors and intermediaries, by limiting the menu of options parties can
adopt contractually.

K. Stadler, Copyright as Trade Regulation, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 899 (2007); Neil W. Netanel, Copyright
and Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE. L.J. 283 (1996); Aaron Perzanowski & Jason Schultz,
Reconciling Intellectual and Personal Property, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1211 (2015).
2 Martin Kretschmer, The Relationship Between Copyright and Contract Law: Regulating Creator
Contracts: The State of the Art and a Research Agenda, 18 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 141, 144 (2010). See
also, Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Dual-Grant Theory of Fair Use, 83 U. CHI. L. REV.
1051, 1060-1061 (2016) (Arguing that the grant of exclusive property rights has a double effect: first, a
negative effect, which takes away certain rights form the public; and second, a positive effect of
depositing these rights in the control of the author. These two effects together force any third party
interested in exploiting a copyright work to: (a) transact with the author; and (b) pay for such use.)
3 The intermediary can be roughly defined as an institutional or individual mediator between the
author and his or her audience. Richard E. Caves, Contracts between Art and Commerce, 17 J. ECON.
PERSP. 73, 73 (2003). (“The inspiration of talented artists reaches consumers’ hands (eyes, ears) only
with the aid of other inputs—humdrum inputs—that respond to ordinary economic incentives.”)
Important to note that not all authors create with the desire or expectation to reap some benefits;
however, authors aiming to derive some compensation from their creative works are less likely to
commercialize their creative work on their own. See, e.g., Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Inspiration and
Innovation: The Intrinsic Dimension of the Artistic Soul, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1945 (2006); Diane
Zimmerman, Copyrights as Incentives: Did We Just Imagine That?, 12 THEORETICAL. INQ. L. 29
(2011). Contra Eric E. Johnson, Intellectual Property and The Incentive Fallacy, 39 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
623, 644-46 (2012).
4 RICHARD WATT, COPYRIGHT AND ECONOMIC THEORY FRIENDS OR FOES? 3 (2000).
5 Alain Strowel & Bernard Vanbrabant, Copyright Licensing: A European View, in RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LICENSING, 31-32 (Jacques de Werra ed.) (2013).
6 I term these measures “hard” interventions, as they are generally coercive, inalienable and nonwaivable.
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Researchers have long acknowledged the existence of such authorprotectionist measures.7 However, no scholar to date has offered a
complete, orderly, and systematic scrutiny of these measures.8 Neither has
any scholar systematically examined whether these interventions have
worked in advancing the interest of the intended beneficiaries, and if so,
specifically whom and under what conditions. This paper aims to fill this
scholastic gap. Providing a unifying perspective for classifying legislative
measures exposes the reader not only to the multiplicity of approaches but
also provides a more comprehensive picture of the field, laying the ground
for in-depth and critical discussion of their distributional implications.9
7 See, e.g., Alain Strowel & Bernard Vanbrabant, Copyright Licensing: A European View, in
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LICENSING, 31-32 (Jacques de Werra ed.) (2013);
Paul Katzenberger, Protection of the Authors as the Weaker Party to a Contract under International
Copyright Contract Law, 19 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L., 731 (1988); Kate Darling,
Occupy Copyright: A Law & Economic Analysis of U.S. Author Termination Right, 63 BUFF. L REV.
147 (2014); Kate Darling, Contracting About the Future: Copyright and New Media, 10 NW. J. TECH. &
INTELL. PROP. 485 (2012); Bernt Hugenholtz, The Great Copyright Robbery: Rights Allocation in a
Digital Environment 2, 9-10 Conference at the NYU School of Law (31 March - 2 April, 2000),
http://www.ivir.nl/publicaties/download/1073 [https://perma.cc/4W3K-AF8K]; Guy A. Rub, Stronger
than Kryptonite: Inalienable Profit Sharing Schemes in Copyright Law, 27 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 49
(2013); Lydia Pallas Loren, Renegotiating the Copyright Deal in the Shadow of the “Inalienable” Right
to Terminate, 62 FLA. L. REV. 1329, 1349 (2010).
8 The following catalog does not purport to be a comprehensive survey of each and every
legislative intervention that exists in Western traditions, rather documenting the most common soft and
hard interventions as found in prominent jurisdictions. Throughout this paper I will rely mainly upon
the United States, Canada, Israel, France, and German legislation to represent both copyright and
authors’ rights traditions. However, discussion is not restricted to those examples or the language of any
legislation in particular.
9 Inevitably, not all potential restrictions on the parties’ freedom of contract have been placed into
the existing copyright regimes. Several clarifications are, therefore, in order here. First, while an
individual author may lack bargaining power, the aggregated power of numerous authors may be
helpful in the pursuit of a more equal bargaining position. In fact, collective bargaining plays an
important role in many countries. See Pedro Letai, Don’t Think Twice, It’s All Right: Toward a New
Copyright Protection System, 5 J. BUS. & ECON. 1012, 1022 (2014). Although, neither collective
bargaining nor collective rights management necessarily imply a specific or even fair distribution of
funds among authors. On average, collective bargaining should yield a more beneficial deal than the
author is able to achieve individually. Id. at 1012. See also Amit Datta, Collective Bargaining
Agreements in the Film Industry: U.S. Guild Agreements for Germany?, 2 BERKELEY J. ENT. & SPORTS
L. 199, 205 (2013); KAMINA PASCAL, FILM COPYRIGHT IN THE EU, 214-20, 242-48 (2002); Daniel
Gervais, Collective Management of Copyright: Theory and Practice in the Digital Age, in COLLECTIVE
MANAGEMENT OF COPYRIGHT AND RELATED RIGHTS (Daniel Gervais ed., 2d ed. 2010); Robert P.
Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and Collective Rights
Organizations, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 1293, 1295 (1996). This research, however, focuses on contracts
concluded between individual authors and their intermediaries. Therefore, measures governing transfers
of rights to collective societies or contracts concluded by a rightholder other than the author are not
considered hereafter. Second, compulsory licenses and levies (or limitation-based remuneration right)
undeniably have bearing on the remuneration of the author. These measures override the author’s right
to authorize or forbid exploitation of her work and convert it onto a mere right-to-receive-remuneration
(liability rule) for acts that implicate one or more of the exclusive rights. Henceforth, the rights are
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A central finding of this paper is the notion that most authors will be
unable to derive much value from the regulatory tools intended to provide
more bargaining power and higher levels of compensation. Indeed, the
aforementioned legislative instruments would affect the distribution of
wealth, but not in the way that policymakers expect. They are likely to
bring about a redistribution of wealth that would benefit a select group at
the expense of a much larger group of authors. Alternatively, as will be
demonstrated, wealth would be redistributed from an author’s younger
self—when he or she is more likely to be under financial constraint—
towards the older self, or even the successors. Consequently, these
legislative interventions can harm the very same group of beneficiaries they
originally intended to help. This article is organized as follows. Part II
provides an overview of author-intermediary contractual relationship. Parts
III-V of this paper will provide a thorough description of the mandatory
result-oriented measures that are used to regulate the author-intermediary
contractual relationship. The first category of measures detailed in section
II is the ex ante restraints on the parties’ ability to determine the form and
level of compensation for copyright transfer, namely: (a) a right to
equitable remuneration, (b) a right to proportional remuneration, and (c) a
minimum royalty rate. Part III will describe the second category of hard
interventions that aim to protect the economic interests of the author vis-àvis the intermediary ex post, especially in circumstances where a huge
being transferred not because of a voluntary transaction. For this reason, these instruments are not part
of the interventions examined in this re-search. For similar reasons, the study of the fair use doctrine
and other limitations and exceptions are outside the scope of this paper. See generally, Christophe
Geiger, Promoting Creativity through Copyright Limitations: Reflections on the Concept of Exclusivity
in Copyright Law, 12 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 515, 529 (2010); JANE C. GINSBURG, THE ROLE OF
THE AUTHOR, in COPYRIGHT IN COPYRIGHT LAW IN AN AGE OF LIMITATIONS AND EXCEPTIONS, 63
(Ruth L. Okediji ed., 2017); S. J. Liebowitz, Alternative Copyright Systems: The Problems With a
Compulsory License, (Based upon a talked delivered at a conference sponsored by the Progress and
Freedom Foundation on June 10, 2003), http://law.haifa.ac.il/images/Publications/hasdara.pdf
[https://perma.cc/DUS4-LRMQ]; Annette Kur & Jens Schovsbo, Expropriation or Fair Game for All?
The Gradual Dismantling of the IP Exclusivity Paradigm, (Max Planck Inst. for Intell. Prop.,
Competition & Tax L., Res. Paper No. 09-14, 2009). Third, and finally, even when confining the
discussion to issues of copyright contracts, there is no question that copyright contracts might be
governed by other bodies of law. For example, requirements imposed by general policy and contract
laws may be applicable to aspects of the contractual relationship. Be that as it may, for the sake of this
research, I have elected to concentrate on copyright and other author-centric legislation. Requirements
imposed by other bodies of law are unspecific, and they may fail to acknowledge the unique
characteristics of copyright protection. Legislatures themselves rarely perceive contract law as a
satisfactory way to regulate this relationship, as evident by the number of legislative measures adopted
around the world. Furthermore, many of the rights and obligations of the parties in the authorintermediary relationship stem not from what the parties themselves have agreed upon, but from the
complex and distinct nature of copyright laws. In which case, the application of such general rules may
be inconsistent with the desire to protect authors’ economic interests in almost all jurisdictions.
Therefore, the detailed analysis of such general provisions is also outside the scope of my research.
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discrepancy between the compensation of the author and the proceeds from
the work exists. This paper identifies two ex post remuneration adjustment
mechanisms: success clauses and resale royalty rights. Part IV details the
third and last category of legislative measures designed to protect authors
and their heirs from the results of contracts concluded under unequal
bargaining conditions by providing the right of reversion.
While the idea of contractual interventions as a means to balance
disparities in bargaining powers seems appealing, in reality, it is
oversimplified and flawed. Part VI of this paper explores whether the
measures identified in Parts III-V truly improve the lot of the authors, or if
they turn out to be counterproductive and harmful to their intended
beneficiaries instead. The Last Part summarizes my key findings and
emphasize that the structural disparities in bargaining powers cannot be
easily remedied by legal interventions alone.
II. COPYRIGHTS CONTRACTS
To understand the possible ramifications of hard interventions it is
crucial to understand the basics of copyrights contracts. Essentially, a
copyright contract represents an exchange of commitments between the
author and the intermediary. On the one hand, the author, transfers some or
all of her rights into the hand of the intermediary.10 In return, the
intermediary assists the author in handling the commercialization of her
work. 11
The author and intermediary are conventionally viewed as partners in
the task of disseminating the author’s work to the largest possible audience
10 For a discussion of alienability and its role within the copyright system, see generally Netanel,
infra note 221, at, 368-70. (Arguing that “Under the utilitarian model, the widespread dissemination of
intellectual works is no less an important goal of copyright than is the creation of those works . . . . For
the proponents of the natural rights theory of copyright, alienability follows from recognizing the
analogy between copyright and the liberal prototype of property. The products of mental labor are
property, just as are the fruits of physical labor. Since alienability (i.e., “saleability”) is an essential
characteristic of property, products of mental labor must also be fully saleable.”)
11 This is not to argue that authors are unable to exploit their works on their own. See, e.g., Lior
Zemer, What Copyright Is: Time to Remember the Basics, 4 BUFF. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 54, 68 (2006).
The reality is, that production and dissemination of copyrighted work often require a significant
financial investment, elaborated infrastructure and expertise. For instance, producing, printing and
disseminating a literary work might require a printing press, warehouse, trucks, and working relations
with various retailers. Authors rarely hold control over or access to such resources. It is important to
note that in the digital age, the phenomena of authors who produce, publish, distribute and market their
own works have become more feasible. However, producers, publishers and distributers remain
important players in the creative market. See Richard Watt, Economic Theory of Copyright Contracts,
in THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN COPYRIGHT AND CONTRACT LAW 24 (STRATEGIC ADVISORY BOARD
FOR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY POLICY 2010), http://eprints.bournemouth.ac.uk/16091/1/_contractlawreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/489J-V8D9].
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and preventing others from infringing the copyright.12 While their interests
are not entirely misaligned, they certainly do not always run parallel.13
There has therefore been a long-simmering tension between authors and
intermediaries, particularly when it comes to the details of the copyright
contract.14 The conflict between authors and their intermediaries reveals
itself most acutely in negotiations regarding the author’s remuneration.15
For instance, a budding author writes an incisive first novel that
catches the eye of a major publishing house. Trusting that the publisher will
disseminate her work to the largest possible audience, and perhaps excited
that her work has been noticed at all, the author grants the rights to the
publisher. The publisher will then strike deals with booksellers, provide
free copies to book critics, and perhaps even schedule the author’s
appearance on a talk show. The publisher, of course, could not undertake
any of these actions without having first obtained the right to use the
novelist’s copyrighted work. Thus, the initial agreement between the author
and the publisher is where the author retains the most power to ensure her
financial remuneration.16
A bargain between an artist such as the novelist described above who
lives for her art, and a multinational corporation with enormous power a
prosperous corporation is what most people envision when considering an
author signing away her rights. Indeed, the literature tends to portray the

12 Not all authors create with the desire or expectation to reap some benefits; however, authors
aiming to derive some compensation from their creative works are less likely to commercialize their
creative work on their own. For further discussion of authors’ intrinsic and extrinsic motives see
Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Inspiration and Innovation: The Intrinsic Dimension of the Artistic Soul, 81
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1945 (2006); Zimmerman, supra note 3. Contra Eric E. Johnson, Intellectual
Property and The Incentive Fallacy, 39 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 623, 644-46 (2012).
13 See Yifat Nahmias, The Limitations of Information: Re-thinking Soft Paternalistic Interventions
in Copyright Law, 37 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 373, 376-8 (2019); Michael Brendon Lopez,
Creating The National Wealth: Authorship, Copyright, and Literary Contracts, 88 N.D. L. REV. 197,
198-9 (2012) (citing Henry C. Mitchell’s assertion that the interests of authors and publishers generally
run parallel); GUIBAULT & HUGENHOLTZ, infra note 121, at 33.
14 See Cornish, infra note 35, at 2.
15 Thomas A. Mitchell, State of the Art(s): Protecting Publishers or Promoting Progress?, 12
RICH. J.L. & TECH. 1, 2 (2005).
16 GIUSEPPINA D’AGOSTINO, COPYRIGHT, CONTRACTS, CREATORS, NEW MEDIA, NEW RULES 22
(2010). While copyright contracts may cover a wide area of activities, this discussion is limited to
contracts and contractual relationship entered into between the author and the intermediary (e.g.,
publisher or producer). To be precise, my dissertation is concerned with contracts in which the author
(i.e., the first right holder) transfers her economic rights in a copyrighted work to a producer, publisher
or any other intermediary to warrant their exploitation. Subsequent contracts between the first transferee
and any third party (including users) may have an enormous effect on the monetary gains derived by the
author; however, these secondary agreements are outside the scope of this research, given that the
author is not a party to the contract. Contracts falling under the work-made-for-hire doctrine are
likewise outside the scope of this research.
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author as naïve and inexperienced. Thus, when she must negotiate with a
powerful corporation over the terms of the contract, she is thought to be at
a distinct disadvantage.17 There may be some truth to this popular view;
many intermediaries have undoubtedly taken advantage of authors. And
yet, even when the author in question is business-savvy, the intermediary
tends to have the upper hand in negotiations.18
Among other reasons, this results largely from an imbalance in the
bargaining positions of authors and intermediaries.19Although the reasons
for this imbalance remain unclear, several reasons have been proposed for
the power disparity between the two.20 One such reason is that many
authors, particularly at the start of their career, are not financially well-off.
They rely on the revenues stemming from their creative works for their
livelihood and cannot simply borrow against their future earnings. The
17

It is important to note that although the “poor artist” story is very appealing, not everyone
subscribes to it. Guy Rub argues that the picture of artists as poor and buyers as rich, as well as the story
that the paradigmatic transaction between the two makes the artist poorer and the buyer richer, is based
on false assumptions. Rub refers to the view advanced by John Henry Merryman and Monroe Price and
claims that it is merely a fable, and therefore should not be grounds for legal policy. See Rub, supra
note 7, at 81-82. (citing Henry Merryman, The Wrath of Robert Rauschenberg, 41 AM. J. COMP. L. 103,
107-108 (1993)); Monroe E. Price, Government Policy and Economic Security for Artists: The Case of
the Droit de Suite, 77 YALE L.J. 1333, 1334-35 (1968). Others argue that the under-compensated author
does not stem from unequal bargaining powers, but it is a result of works of low quality. See Maureen
A. O’Rourke, A Brief History of Author-Publisher Relations and the Outlook for the 21th Century, 50 J.
COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 425, 437 (2002). (citing Alan White, Public Lending Right, in RAYMOND
ASTBURY, THE WRITER IN THE MARKET PLACE 25, 28 (1969); Arnold Plant, The Economic Aspects of
Copyright in Books, 1 ECONOMICA 167, 182-4 (1934). Cf. Katzenberger, supra note 7, at 731
(suggesting that even famous authors are nonetheless the weaker party).
18 Jacques de Werra, Moving Beyond the Conflict Between Freedom of Contract and Copyright
Policies: In Search of a New Global Policy for On-line Information Licensing Transactions, a
Comparative Analysis Between U.S. Law and European Law, 25 COLUM.J.L. & ARTS 239, 246 (2003).
19 See MARTIN KRETSCHMER ET AL., COPYRIGHT CONTRACTS AND EARNINGS OF VISUAL
CREATORS: A SURVEY OF 5,800 BRITISH DESIGNERS, FINE ARTISTS, ILLUSTRATORS AND
PHOTOGRAPHERS 3 (2011), https://microsites.bournemouth.ac.uk/cippm/files/2011/05/DACS-ReportFinal1.pdf [https://perma.cc/7H9A-HX67]; Giuseppina D’Agostino, Contract lex rex: Towards
copyright contract’s lex specialis in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND GENERAL LEGAL PRINCIPLES: IS IP
A LEX SPECIALIS? 1, 4 (Graeme B. Dinwoodie ed. 2015) 12; See also infra note 20 and accompanying
text.
20 See, e.g. Kate Darling, Occupy Copyright—A Law & Economic Analysis of U.S. Author
Termination Right, 63 BUFF. L REV. 147 (2014); Rub, supra note 7; Martin Kretschmer, Does
Copyright Law Matter? An Empirical Analysis of Creators’ Earnings (Univ. of Glasgow, Working
Paper, 2012), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2063735; [https://perma.cc/EK4C-RC99]; Guy Pessach,
Deconstructing Disintermediation—A Skeptical Copyright Perspective, 31 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J.
833 (2013); John M. Kernochan, Ownership and Control of Intellectual Property Rights in Audiovisual
Works: Contracts and Practice—Report to the ALAI Congress, Paris, Sept. 20, 1995, 20 COLUM.-VLA
J.L. & ARTS 379 (1996). See also, Günther G. Schulze, Superstars, in A HANDBOOK OF CULTURAL
ECONOMICS 431, 431-36 (Ruth Towse ed., 2003); William A. Hamlen, Jr., Superstardom in Popular
Music: Empirical Evidence, 73 REV. ECON. & STAT. 729 (1991); Sherwin Rosen, The Economics of
Superstars, 71 AM. ECON. REV. 845 (1981).
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intermediary, meanwhile, is typically a larger corporation that does not
need revenues from a single work to survive; a wide array of revenue
streams maintains their profit line.21 These contrasting situations result in
the author being more willing to accept an offer that might be
disadvantageous in the long-term.22 Another reason for the power disparity
is that there are far fewer intermediaries than authors in the industry,23 often
forcing the author to accept questionable contracts because she has
nowhere else to go.24 Finally, and perhaps most obviously, authors do not
often negotiate copyright contracts. Their relative inexperience in this
matter gives the well-practiced intermediary an enormous leg-up in the
negotiation process.25 Scholar Nancy Kim has identified an additional
factor, that is, the “background law” in effect at the time of the
negotiation.26 Indeed, her research indicates that laws governing the
particulars of copyright contracts can influence the negotiating position of
both parties, perhaps with unpredictable effects.27 Furthermore, a party’s
ignorance of the background law could put them at a sharp disadvantage.28
Kim also pointed to “market power,” the capacity to control norms within
an industry, as a decisive factor in creating an imbalance in copyright
negotiations.29 These two additional factors are of particular importance for

21

Id. at 507-8.
Kate Darling, Contracting About the Future: Copyright and New Media, 10 NW. J. TECH. &
INTELL. PROP. 485, 507 (2012) (Noting that this assumption has been criticized “[a]s not entirely
realistic.”).
23 Lack of competition in the market is of a great importance for the terms of the agreement. See
Duncan Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalist Motives in Contract and Tort Law, with Special
Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power, 41 MD. L. REV. 563, 616 (1982). See
also, Rub, supra note 7, at 101 (discussing non-competitive markets in the context of creative
industries); Darling, supra note 22, at 509-511 (discussing insufficient competition in different markets
for copyrighted works).
24 Bernt Hugenholtz, The Great Copyright Robbery: Rights Allocation in a Digital Environment 2,
9-10 Conference at the NYU School of Law (31 March - 2 April, 2000),
http://www.ivir.nl/publicaties/download/1073 [https://perma.cc/8YXU-6D7D].
25 See Daniel D. Barnhizer, Inequality of Bargaining Power, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 139, 199-223
(2005).
26 Nancy S. Kim, Bargaining Power and Background Law, 12 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 93, 94
(2009).
27 See id. at 95.
28 Id. at 97-102 (discussing knowledge imbalance in the context of artist-hiring party and
employee-employer relationships and arguing that the work-made-for-hire doctrine creates two
exceptions to the typical initial rights allocation under copyright law).
29 Id. at 106 (discussing power market imbalance in the context of software company-consumer
relationships as well as creative consumer-corporate website relationships and arguing that companies’
ability to dictate business norms undermines the traditional contracting process).
22
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the following discussion of legislative interventions into the authorintermediary contractual relationship as will be illustrated below.30
A complicating factor for copyright contracts is the existence of
asymmetric information regarding the true value of the author’s work.31
Both the author and the intermediary are negotiating based partially on
predictions regarding the work’s value, but asymmetric information gives
the intermediary an upper hand.32 For example, the author might negotiate
with only the knowledge of how well her previous work has performed. At
best, she could hire an agent to assess market demand. The intermediary,
meanwhile, has a wealth of information to bolster his bargaining power. He
can evaluate precise sales figures for the genre in question, consider
whether other intermediaries are about to promote similar works, or even
hire a team to study market demand. Not only does the author lack such
information, but she would also have to pay a great deal to obtain it.33 This
asymmetric information will impact how well the author can protect her
financial interests. It will also allow intermediaries to profit in ways they
could not have if the author had access to the same facts.
It is imperative to understand that the remuneration of the author or
profit-sharing arrangements between the author and the intermediary,
stipulated by a contract for the exploitation of a copyrighted work, can take
on many different forms. A short online search for copyright contracts
yields hundreds of samples constructed on a case-by-case basis.
Nevertheless, many of the contracts display commonalities that reflect
industry standards. Therefore, it is possible to make some general
statements in this regard.34 Intermediaries and authors generally agree to
one of three models. At the one end of the spectrum are contracts based on
the pure buy-out model, where the rights are transferred to the intermediary
for a single payment. The terms, including the amount paid to the author,
are determined by the respective bargaining power of the parties and the
30 See Watt, supra note 11; see also Abhinay Muthoo, Bargaining Theory and Royalty Contract
Negotiations, 3 REV. ECON. RES. ON COPYRIGHT ISSUES 19 (2006) (claiming that several factors
influence the end result of the negotiation, namely reservation values, impatience, risk of breakdown
during the negotiations, the existence and value of other options and asymmetric information).
31 Loren, supra note 7, at 1331.
32 See generally Darling, supra note 22, at 512.
33 Id. at 512-13. The author is more inclined to under-estimate or over-estimate the value of her
work. In this regard, it is also important to note that the literature drawing from behavioral economics
suggests that the endowment effect may leads authors to over-evaluate their works. For a general
discussion of the endowment effect in the contexts of copyright, see Christopher Buccafusco &
Christopher Sprigman, Valuing Intellectual Property: An Experiment, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (2010).
34 See Ruth Towse, Copyright and Economic Incentives: An Application to Performers’ Rights in
the Music Industry, 52 KYKLOS 369 (1999). (discussing some generalizations and the industry standards
in the music industry).
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dynamics of bargaining process. Upon payment, the intermediary can fully
utilize the rights transferred under the terms of the contract. Moreover, the
very same intermediary retains the entire future stream of revenues the
authorized use generates. Furthermore, as some commentators have pointed
out, under the buy-out model the author not only transfers the right to the
intermediary, but also any associated risks.35 This is important because of
the high risks and uncertainty associated with the market for most
copyrighted works, as well as asymmetric information between parties.
Broadly speaking, a transfer contract may serve as a risk-sharing device
and help solve the asymmetric information problem. By transferring the
uncertain future value of the copyrighted work into the hands of the
intermediary, the author receives a certain payment.36 Consequently, if the
work proves to be a bigger success than anticipated, the intermediary will
reap the benefit. If it is not as successful as anticipated by the parties, the
intermediary will suffer the loss.37 In fact, it can be said that the author
trades the possibility that the work will turn out to be a success against the
risk it will not.38 Although Watt argues that from an economic perspective,
the buy-out model is a very good option for the parties only under certain
conditions (i.e., in the absence of risk or uncertainty as to the future value
of a work).39 In reality, this model is more common in situations where it is
necessary to obtain rights held by numerous entities but can be found in
other circumstances as well.40
At the other end of the spectrum are long-term and success-contingent
contracts. The success contingent contract provides the author with a
certain share (percentage) of the proceeds from the work (e.g., royalties).
Royalty rates vary by industry as well as among authors. Still, Watt notes
there are two types of success-contingent contracts: the first is based on
fixed royalties’ percentage independent of the amount of revenue received;

35 Watt, supra note 11, at 24; see also William Cornish, The Author as Risk-Sharer, 26 COLUM.
J.L. & ARTS 1 (2002); Kretschmer, supra note 2, at 160-162; Arthur Snow & Richard Watt, Risk
Sharing and the Distribution of Copyright Collective Income, in DEVELOPMENTS IN THE ECONOMICS OF
COPYRIGHT 23 (L.N. Takeyama, W.J. Gordon & R. Towse eds., 2005); Watt, infra note 42; David
Lindsay, The Law and Economics of Copyright, Contract and Mass Market Licenses 99-100 (Center for
Copyright Studies Ltd., 2002); EYAL ZAMIR & BARAK MEDINA, LAW, ECONOMICS AND MORALITY 258
(2010).
36 It has been argued that authors do not have the same degree of risk aversion as intermediaries.
Further, an intermediary can use revenues from very successful works to cover expenses for less
successful works. See generally Cornish, supra note 35, at 1-2; Watt, supra note 4, at 88-89.
37 See Paul M. Horvitz, The Pricing of Textbooks and the Remuneration of Authors, 56 AM. ECON.
REV. 412, 414 (1966).
38 See generally, Cornish, supra note 35.
39 Watt, supra note 11, at 25.
40 Towse, supra note 34, at 374.
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the second involves a variable royalties’ percentage, namely, a function of
the amount of revenue received.41 So, for example, in the first instance, the
contract provides the author with royalties set at 3% of the revenues,
irrespectively of the amount of revenues. In the latter instance, the author is
entitled to royalties set at 3% when the revenue is lower than a given
amount and 5% when the revenue is above that same amount.
Whatever form it may take, the success-contingent model is
comprised of future payments calculated based on market revenues. Hence,
it requires the author and the intermediary to share in the risks associated
with investing in the work and provides an incentive for both parties to
invest in the commercialization of the work.42
Occupying the “middle” of the spectrum are different variations of
contracts based on the combined model. Under the combined model, the
author can receive a mixture of royalties and a lump-sum payment in
advance. This model has several advantages over the other models. For
example, the early payment can help reduce an author’s uncertainty
associated with the success-contingent model considering the uncertain
future value of a copyrighted work.43 In addition, an early payment can help
an intermediary—e.g., a publisher—persuade an author to work with that
intermediary.44 On the other hand, Watt observes that although using the
lump-sum payment in conjunction with success-contingent terms can
decrease an author’s uncertainty, it is often stipulated as “forwarded royalty
payments.”45 This means that the advance payment is credited or
“recouped” against future royalties. As a result, this approach does not
necessarily yield higher rewards for authors.
On the whole, authors often transfer their rights to intermediaries,
either in the form of an assignment or a license.46 For this, they are either
41

See, e.g., Watt, supra note 11 at 25.
Both the licensee and the licensor have a strong incentive to see their work successful in the
market. The royalty rate represents a tradeoff between the incentive to the author and the incentive to
the intermediary. For a detailed discussion of the optimal royalty that solves the tradeoff between giving
incentives to the author and to the publisher, see Inés Macho-Stadler & David Pérez-Castrillo,
Copyright Licensing Under Asymmetric Information, 11 REV. OF ECON. RES. ON COPYRIGHT ISSUES 3
(2014); Richard Watt, Revenue Sharing as Compensation for Essential Inputs, 8 REV. OF ECON. RES.
ON COPYRIGHT ISSUES 51 (2011).
43 Towse, supra note 34, at 373 (discussing some generalization and the industry standards in the
music industry).
44 Id.
45 Watt, supra note, 11, at 26.
46 See Jessica Litman, Real Copyright Reform, 96 IOWA L. REV. 1, 10-12 (2010) (discussing the
relationship between creators and intermediaries and how authors transfer their rights to intermediaries
for distribution under copyright laws). See also SEVERINE DUSOLLIER ET AL., CONTRACTUAL
ARRANGEMENTS APPLICABLE TO CREATORS: LAW AND PRACTICE OF SELECTED MEMBER STATES
(2014),
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/etudes/join/2014/493041/IPOL42
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compensated by lump-sum payments independent of the proceeds received
from the exploitations of their work, or some type of royalty payments.
Therefore, the very first decisions an author must make as part of the
exploitation of her work are to whom to entrust the right to use her work, in
what form to transfer her rights, and for which model of compensation to
settle.
Conventional wisdom suggests that the less concentrated the industry
is, the stronger the bargaining position of the author.47 Therefore, one
would expect the online environment—which provides the author with
greater opportunities for autonomous exploitation— to decrease the power
that intermediaries wield over authors.48 This is not necessarily the case.
Take for example the music industry. In 2007, Radiohead decided to
release an album through the band’s own web site, without engaging a
record company.49 Consequently, the band retained ownership of the rights
linked to the album. The album turned out to be a huge success, and some
reports suggest the band’s profits from it go beyond $6.5 million.50 It would
therefore seem as if Radiohead found a new means to distribute music and
cut out the intermediary.
It bears emphasis, though, this disintermediation option has not
occurred on a large scale. Just because the Internet has the ability to
connect authors and users, it does not necessarily obviate the need for
intermediaries.51 This is especially true when the author lacks the

JURI_ET(2014)493041_EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/TXC9-7FLY]; Pedro Letai, Don’t Think Twice, It’s
All Right: Toward a New Copyright Protection System, 5 J. BUS. & ECON. 1012, 1014 (2014) (“Creators
may, of course, release their own works to the public, but in practice the copyright system is designed
with the expectation that many creators will contract with intermediaries to exploit their works
commercially.”).
47 See Pessach, supra note 20, at 844-45.
48 This argument has often been constructed based on the idea of disintermediation. See Mark Fox,
E-commerce Business Models for the Music Industry, 27 POPULAR MUSIC AND SOC’Y 201 (2004)
(emphasizing the influence of disintermediation on competition and authors’ compensation); Jesse C.
Bockstedt, Robert J. Kauffman & Frederick J. Riggins, The Move to Artist-Led On-Line Music
Distribution: A Theory-Based Assessment and Prospects for Structural Changes in the Digital Music
Market, 10 INT’L J. OF ELECTRONIC COMM. 7 (2006) (predicting the weakening in positions of record
labels and other intermediaries); Amy Gilbert, The Time Has Come: A Proposed Revision to 17 U.S.C.
§ 203, 66 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 807, 841 (2016).
49 Radiohead then made the album available at www.inrainbows.com, where fans were able to pay
as much as they want for the digital downloading.
50 Sara Karubian, 360° Deals: An Industry Reaction to the Devaluation of Recorded Music, 18 S.
CAL. INTERDIS. L.J. 395 (2009).
51 See Arnold Picot, Christine Bortenlanger &And Heiner Re Hrl, The Organization of Electronic
Markets: Contributions from the New Institutional Economics, 13 INFO. SOC’Y 107, 115-116 (1997)
(“The electronization of markets does not automatically lead to markets without middlemen. A more
differentiated intermediation structure is far more realistic than the total with minimal search costs.”).
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experience, infrastructure and business skills of the intermediary.52 After
all, bands such as Radiohead are well-known and backed by a group of
skilled professionals (i.e., public relations experts and managers). They also
enjoy a large fan base. Most authors will find it difficult to adopt such
independent distribution methods. In fact, even Radiohead eventually
contracted with iTunes and a new distributer to sell albums online and in
stores.53 Another group of authors that may take advantage of the online
environment to disseminate their works without the help of traditional
intermediaries are new and aspiring authors and artists. They upload their
content online, sometimes for free, with the hope of gaining popularity and
exposure.54 One of the most frequently cited online success stories is Justin
Bieber. His official biography states that Scooter Braun, an entrepreneur
eager to start his own record label and management company, discovered
him after watching several of his YouTube videos.55 Nevertheless, Bieber
later entered into a contractual agreement with a more traditional
intermediary (i.e., Island Def Jam Records). Hence, intermediaries still play
a vital role in the copyright industries.
Even if a few superstars can operate without an intermediary, it does
not mean that the industry is becoming less concentrated or that
intermediaries are becoming obsolete. In fact, the online environment
allows intermediaries to reinvent themselves and for new intermediaries to
emerge.56 Guy Pessach argues this is particularly true if one takes into
consideration the limited ability an author has to effectively reach an
audience.57

52

Patryk Galuszka, Music Aggregators and Intermediation of the Digital Music Market, 9 INT’L. J.
COMM. 254, 256 (2015).
53 See Karubian, supra note 50.
54 Singers, entertainers, authors and comedians are among the groups of authors and performers
that tends to utilize the online environment to disseminate their works and create opportunities.
YouTube and other similar services can serve as a platform for authors and performing artists to create
opportunities—it mediates between aspiring authors and traditional intermediaries (e.g., managers,
agents and record companies).
55 Reuven Ashtar, Licensing as Digital Rights Management, from the Advent of the Web to the
iPad, 13 YALE J. L. & TECH. 141, 181-82 (2011).
56 See generally, Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Music Markets and Mythologies, 9 J. MARSHALL REV.
INTELL. PROP. L. 831 (2010).
57 See Pessach, supra note 20, at 844. (“Seemingly, the Internet and networked communication
platforms provide almost an unlimited range of distribution platforms. Nevertheless, if one adds the
parameter of effective audience attention and the ability to effectively reach audiences, in realms of
information overflow, reality appears different. What we witness is a reduction in the number of
effective distribution platforms, as well as concurrent escalation in their market share. At the same time,
the popularity of these platforms tends to increase their attractiveness to both users and content
providers—a factor which either sustains or increases the centrality and market share of these
platforms.”).
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So long as there exists an imbalance in bargaining power between
author and intermediary, the latter will continue to receive a large portion
of the profits generated by the copyright system, often at the author’s
expense.58 Of course, authors are not only incentivized by profit, and they
can distribute their works outside of the typical methods of their industry.59
But most authors rely on at least some remuneration for their work, and
without the expectation of financial return many authors might cease to
create new work.
One may argue that this is a byproduct of the market for copyrighted
works. However, considering that copyright is often perceived as a right
designed to promote the economic wellbeing of authors, this is a
fundamental weakness that may undermine the system as a whole.60
Governments are well aware of this issue, and have developed laws and
policies to resolve the issue. Such initiatives are usually aimed at
strengthening the author’s bargaining position vis-à-vis the intermediary.
Author protectionist measures can be roughly divided into two broad
categories: soft and hard interventions. Soft interventions typically require
the parties to abide by certain legislative requirements but leave a wide
range of choices in implementing said requirements (e.g., mandatory
disclosure rules). The focus of such intervention is to improve the author’s
position by promoting information exchange and disclosure.61 They
benevolently push the author away from risk or encourage her to make

58

See Lea Shaver, Copyright and Inequality, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 117, 141 (2014) (“The
advantages of copyright protection are reaped primarily by those already privileged: affluent
consumers, the most successful creators, and major publishing houses and other copyright holders
located in industrialized countries.”) See also Justin Hughes and Robert P. Merges, Copyright and
Distributive Justice, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 513 (2016); Litman, supra note 46, at 27-28.
59 Plant, supra note 17, at 168-169. Martin Senftleben applies Pierre Bourdieu’s sociological
analysis of the field of literary and artistic production and distinguishes between autonomous and
bourgeois authors (e.g., those who create for commercial motives and those who create to gain the
recognition of their peers. Martin Senftleben, Copyright, Creators and Society’s Need for Autonomous
Art—the Blessing and Curse of Monetary Incentives in WHAT IF WE COULD REIMAGINE COPYRIGHT?
25-72 (Rebecca Giblin and Kimberlee Weatherall eds., 2017). Furthermore, he claims that “An artist
seeking to gain recognition among peers must not align her work with the tastes of the masses and
produce mainstream works in the hope of commercial success. This would be perceived as a concession
to the predominant profit orientation of society.” Id. at 27. See also Ruth Towse, Partly for the Money:
Rewards and Incentives to Artists, 54 KYKLOS 473, 475 (2001) (“[C]opyright law plays an important
role in the balancing act as it represents both intrinsic and extrinsic incentives . . . .”).
60 Robert M. Hurt & Robert M. Schuchman, The Economic Rationale of Copyright, 56 AM. ECON.
REV. 421-32 (1966). See also Sean M. O’Connor, Creators, Innovators, and Appropriation
Mechanisms, 22 GEO. MASON L. REV. 973, 980 (2015) (“[T]hey all need some means of supporting both
themselves and the practical instantiation of their ideas.”).
61 For a detailed discussion of soft intervention and their benefits as well as shortcoming, see Yifat
Nahmias, The Limitations of Information: Re-thinking Soft Paternalistic Interventions in Copyright
Law, 37 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 373 (2019).
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decisions that the legislator perceives to be in her best interests, but stop
short of mandating a certain result.62 By contrast, hard interventions are
more intrusive and result-oriented. They are also intended to strengthen the
author’s bargaining position but, unlike soft interventions, require a certain
outcome that the parties cannot alter contractually. Concretely, these
measures ensure a minimum level of remuneration to authors ex ante,63
either by providing them with an inalienable right to ask for modification
of the compensation stipulated in the contract ex post,64 or by granting them
an inalienable right to regain control of their previously transferred rights.65
Put differently, these measures are specifically aimed to redress the
disparities in bargaining power between authors and intermediaries by
limiting the menu of options parties can adopt contractually.66
This paper is focused on hard interventions and will analyze their
particulars in the coming sections.
III. EX-ANTE RESTRICTIONS ON THE FREEDOM TO DETERMINE THE FORM
AND LEVEL OF COMPENSATION

As indicated earlier, buy-out contracts provide for a single
remuneration or a lump-sum payment. These lump-sum payments are set ex
ante and are mostly reliant on the anticipated success of the work.67
Whether or not the work eventually turns out to be a success has no bearing
on the remuneration of the author. If the work is not as successful as
anticipated, the intermediary will sustain losses. However, if the work
proves to be a bigger success than anticipated, only the intermediary will
reap the benefits. In this case, there is a chance that the author would be
deprived of a “fair share” in the economic success of the work.68 This is

62 See id. (Arguing that because authors are susceptible to various cognitive limitations, many of
them are unable to understand the information soft interventions produce, much less incorporate the
information into their decision-making. Hence, interventions that incentivize information exchange
generally fall short of achieving the legislative goal.).
63 See, e.g., Law for the Protection of Literature and Authors in Israel, 5773-2013, S.H. 2407. p.
208, http://www.oit.org/dyn/natlex/docs/ELECTRONIC/97289/115377/F-1621783321/ISR97289.pdf
[https://perma.cc/NQ99-UUK3] [hereinafter Law for the Protection of Literature].
64 Wilhelm Nordemann, A Revolution of Copyright in Germany, 49 J. COPY. SOC’Y U.S. 1044
(2002).
65 17 U.S.C. §§ 203, 304.
66 I term these measures “hard” interventions, as they are generally coercive, inalienable and nonwaivable.
67 See Horvitz, supra note 37.
68 See Slobodan M. Markovic, Copyright Contracts Law—Creativity on the Market, Legal Aspects,
6 ZBOTNIK HRVATSKOG DRUSTVA ZA AUTORSKO PRAVO 55 (2005) (Croat.) http://hdap-alai.hr/wpcontent/uploads/2014/06/Markovic-Copyright-Contracts-Law-Creativity-in-the-Market-LegalAspects.pdf [https://perma.cc/HQK7-NJ8U].
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especially true of young and unknown authors who, in the hopes of gaining
a contract and some recognition, usually agree to a very low compensation.
As a result, several jurisdictions have chosen to counterbalance the effects
and quantity of lump-sum payments by imposing at least one of the
following: (a) a right to equitable remuneration, (b) a right to proportional
remuneration, or (c) a minimum royalty rate.69 While at first glance these
measures appear distinct from each other, they are actually similar in their
restrictions on the freedom to determine the form and level of
compensation.
A. Equitable Remuneration
A legal measure commonly used to address the issue of low
bargaining power early in an author’s career is the equitable remuneration
right. German legislators introduced the author’s statutory right to equitable
remunerations in 2002 as part of a larger reform of copyright law.70 It was
not intended to “protect authors merely in cases of blatant abuse of
negotiating power by the exploiters, but to create legal arrangements for
bringing about a general and comprehensive balancing of interests between
authors and exploiters with regard to remuneration.”71 Accordingly, the

69 GESETZ ZUR STÄRKUNG DER VERTRAGLICHEN STELLUNG VON URHEBERN UND AUSÜBENDEN
KÜNSTLERN [Act to Strengthen the Contractual Position of Authors and Performing Artists], Mar. 22,
2002, BGBl I, at 1155-115 (Ger.), http://www.urheberrecht.org/law/normen/urhg/2002-0322/materialien/bgbl_I_1155.php, translated in Act on Copyright and Related Rights,
https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_urhg/englisch_urhg.html;
[https://perma.cc/A3G2AZYY]; CODE LA PROPRIÉTÉ INTELLECTUELLE [CPI] [Intellectual Property Code] arts. L.122-7 - L.
131-4 (Fr.), translated in Intellectual Property Code, www.legifrance.gouv.fr/content/location/1742
[https://perma.cc/H4QC-2BJV]; Law for the Protection of Literature, supra note 63.
70 The amendment is known as the Act to Strengthen the Contractual Position of Authors and
Performing Artists. GESETZ ZUR STÄRKUNG DER VERTRAGLICHEN STELLUNG VON URHEBERN UND
KÜNSTLERN,
Mar.
22,
2002,
BGBl
I,
at
1155-115
(Ger.),
AUSÜBENDEN
http://www.urheberrecht.org/law/normen/urhg/2002-03-22/materialien/bgbl_I_1155.php, translated in
Act
on
Copyright
and
Related
Rights,
https://www.gesetze-iminternet.de/englisch_urhg/englisch_urhg.html [https://perma.cc/A3G2-AZYY]; For a detailed
discussion of the legislative background, see Karsten M. Gutsche, Equitable Remuneration For Authors
In Germany—How The German Copyright Act Secures Their Rewards, 50 J. COPY. SOC’Y U.S. 257
(2002); Nordemann, supra note 64, at 1043-44.
71 Bundesverfassungsgericht [Federal Constitutional Court], Order of the First Senate of 23
October 2013 - 1 BvR 1842/11 - paras. 82, http://www.bverfg.de/e/rs20131023_1bvr184211en.html
[https://perma.cc/P66P-7A33] (Ger.). See also, Adolf Dietz, Amendment of German Copyright Law in
Order to Strengthen the Contractual Position of Authors and Performers, 33 NT’L REV. INTELL. PROP.
COMPETITION L. 828 (2002); Marjut Salokannel, STUDY ON THE AUDIOVISUAL PERFORMERS’
CONTRACTS AND REMUNERATION PRACTICES IN FRANCE AND GERMANY, AVP/IM/03/3B, 31-32 (Ad
Hoc Informal Meeting on The Protection of Audiovisual Performances Geneva, November 6 and 7,
2003),
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/copyright/en/avp_im_03/avp_im_03_3b.pdf.
[https://perma.cc/M3C7-HRUM].
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right to equitable remuneration cannot be waived or circumvented
contractually.72
This right to equitable remuneration comes into play in two different
situations. Firstly, if the amount of remuneration has not been determined
in the contract, the law specifically states that the author has a right to an
equitable remuneration for the transfer of her rights.73 Secondly, if the
parties have already stipulated a certain amount of remuneration in the
copyright contract, but the court finds that the compensation stipulated in
the agreement violates the equitable remuneration requirement,74 the author
may ask the intermediary to modify the contract so as to ensure equitable
remuneration to the author.75
To that end, the German legislation assigns an important role to
collective bargaining and common remuneration schemes.76 Remunerations
that stem from a collective agreement or adhere to joint remuneration
schemes (“Gemeinsame Vergütungsregeln”), are considered by German
law to be fair.77
In the absence of a collective agreement or joint remuneration scheme,
the remuneration negotiated between the author and the counterparty is
considered equitable if it conforms to what is both customary and fair in the
industry at the time of contracting.78 This consideration takes into account

72 GESETZ ÜBER URHEBERRECHT UND VERWANDTE SCHUTZRECHTE [Urheberrechtsgesetz] [UrhG]
[Copyright Act], Sept. 9, 1965, BGBl I at 1273, §32(3) (Ger.), http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de.
[hereinafter GERMAN COPYRIGHT ACT] [https://perma.cc/2WRG-JCES] Important to note however that
the author may grant an interested party a non-exclusive right to use her work free of charge.
73 Id. Article 32(3).
74 As will be further discussed in the next section, German law deals separately with the surprise
best-seller or success problem.
75 GERMAN COPYRIGHT ACT, supra note 72, Article 32(1); see also, BVerfG, Order of the First
Senate
of
23
October
2013
1
BvR
1842/11
paras.
(1-115),
http://www.bverfg.de/e/rs20131023_1bvr184211en.html [https://perma.cc/P4SJ-EYLP].
76 See
Drucksache
Deutscher
Bundestag
14/6433,
June
26,
2001,
http://www.urheberrecht.org/UrhGE-2000/download/1406426.pdf [https://perma.cc/2XDR-LD86].
77
The Act encourages third-party groups such as authors, publishers, and other associations to fix
appropriate remuneration rates under the so-called joint remuneration schemes. Section 36 supplements
Section 32 by creating remuneration standards. These remunerations serve as a benchmark for any
discussion of appropriate remuneration, where only collective agreements will take priority over them
given that such collective agreements are binding. See Nordemann, supra note 64, at 1046. See also,
Hilty & Peukert, infra note 79, at 427-28. To that end, Article § 32(4) explicitly states that the author
may not ask for a modification of the contract if the remuneration is regulated by either of these
schemes and agreements. See GERMAN COPYRIGHT ACT, supra note 72, Article 32(4).
78 In this regard, it is important to note that the 2002 Act deems terms set as the result of a
negotiation between collective organizations and intermediary to be “fair.” See GERMAN COPYRIGHT
ACT, supra note 72, Article 32(2). For a detailed discussion see Gerhard Schricker, Efforts for a Better
Law on Copyright Contracts in Germany—A Never-Ending Story?, 35 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. &
COMPETITION L. 850, 852 (2004).
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the type and scope of rights assigned, duration of use, and other relevant
circumstances.79 However, in a series of cases involving the rights of
translators, the court determined that compliance with customary
remuneration practices do not necessarily fulfill the fair requirement.
Stating that “a given remuneration is only fair when it equally takes
account of the interests of the author besides those of the exploiter.”80 What
is more, in this cases the court used the Common Remuneration Rules for
Writers of German Fiction as a guideline for the development of a fair
remuneration standard for translators. Thus, turning a specific common
remuneration rule into a general yardstick for the establishment of fair
remuneration standards for the entire sector by way of analogy.81
Important to mention that, the assessment criteria for the equitability
of the compensation stipulated in the contract is based on the amount
determined to be equitable by the court specifically at the time the contract
was concluded ex ante.82 The author, therefore, can raise a claim to modify
the contract only once during the life of the contract.
On the whole, the principle of equitable remuneration neither
explicitly prohibits lump-sum contracts nor obliges the parties to a
minimum level of remuneration.83 Nevertheless, the requirement for the
compensation made to an author to meet the general fairness criteria may
imply a predisposition against contracts stipulating a one-time lump-sum
payment. More so, when courts are prone to find buy-out contracts to be

79 Hilty and Peukert note that the explanatory memorandum of the 2002 amendment list few
relevant criteria, namely, “market conditions, investment, risk-taking accruing costs, number of copies
produced and expected proceeds.” Reto M. Hilty & Alexander Peukert, “Equitable Remuneration” In
Copyright Law: The Amended German Copyright Act as a Trap For The Entertainment Industry In The
U.S.?, 22 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 401, 431 (2004). See also, Alexander Peukert, Protection of
Authors and Performing Artists in International Law—Considering the Example of Claims for
Equitable Remuneration Under German and Italian Copyright Law, 35 IIC 900, 903 (2004).
80 See Martin Senftleben, More Money for Creators and More Support for Copyright in Society—
Fair Remuneration Rights in Germany and the Netherlands, 41 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 413, 424 (2018)
(quoting Bundesgerichtshof [BGH], [Federal Court of Justice] October 7, 2009, case I ZR 38/07, 11,
Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht 2009, 1148 (1150) with case comment by R. Jacobs;
Bundesgerichtshof [BGH], [Federal Court of Justice] October 7, 2009 I ZR 230/06, 12, available at
https://perma.cc/ZX4U-9H3T).
81 See Martin Senftleben, Copyright, Creators and Society’s Need for Autonomous Art—the
Blessing and Curse of Monetary Incentives, in What If We Could Reimagine Copyright? 25, 52-54
(Rebecca Giblin & Kimberlee Weatherall eds., 2017), https://press.anu.edu.au/publications/what-if-wecould-reimagine-copyright [https://perma.cc/62NV-PKHA]; Senftleben, supra note 80, at 425.
82 See Gutsche, supra note 70, at 261. However, it is important to note that such corrective claim
for the amendment of remuneration cannot be raised in case where the remuneration was stipulated as
part of a collective bargaining agreement.
83 See Martin Schippan, Codification of contract rules for copyright owners—the recent
amendment of the German Copyright Act, 24 E.I.P.R. 171, 171-174 (2002).
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inequitable.84 Further, the legislative pressure on the parties to use
collectively negotiated remuneration agreements and courts’ inclination to
employ them as a yardstick curtails the bottom rung of the remuneration
distribution ladder.85 Taken together, these principles operate as a de facto
remuneration floor.86
B. Proportional Remuneration
Another way in which legislators attempt to guarantee the author an
appropriate remuneration ex ante is by having an unassignable, unwaivable
right to proportional remuneration. Under the principle of proportional
remuneration, authors who transfer their rights—whether in part or in
whole—are entitled to participate proportionally in the proceeds resulting
from the commercial exploitation of their work.87 The idea behind this
84

For instance, in the cases of Talking to Addison and Destructive Emotions, the German Federal
Court in Munich (“Oberland-esgericht”) examined whether the common scheme of fixed fee per
translated page, in addition to the very low profit sharing arrangement was both customary and fair.
Taking the nature and scope of the rights granted as well as other circumstances into account, and in
light of the general fairness criteria articulated in the Act, the court found that while the remuneration
scheme was common in the relevant industry, it was nevertheless inequitable. Consequently, in both
cases, the court held that it was necessary to provide the translator with a share of the revenues based on
a certain number of copies sold (namely, 0.8% for hardcover books and 0.4% for paperback books). See
Talking to Adison, Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Oct. 7, 2009, I ZR 38/07, Neue
Juristische Wochenschrift [NJW] GRUR 2010, 771 (Ger.); Destructive Emotions, Bundesgerichtshof
[BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Jan. 20, 2011, I ZR 19/90 GRUR 2011, 328 (Ger.), upheld, on
constitutional challenge by the publisher concerned, BVerfG (Federal Constitutional Court), Oct. 23,
2013, GRUR 2014, 169 (Ger.). See also Michael Gruenberger & Adolf Dietz, Germany, in 2-GER
INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE § 4 (Paul Edward Geller ed., 2017); Senftleben,
supra note 59, at 25, 52-4.
85 See in comparison scholarly discussion of union role in creating a de facto minimum wage for
organized employees, David Metcalf, Kirstine Hansen & Andy Charlwood, Unions and the Sword of
Justice: Unions and Pay Systems, Pay Inequality, Pay Discrimination and Low Pay, 167 NAT’L INST.
ECON. REV. 61 (2001) (arguing that unions negotiate over the minimum wage, truncating the lower end
of the pay scale).
86 Take for example the model contract for translation contracts, which came into force on April 1,
2014. This model contract establishes basic compensation in the amount of 19 euros per page, plus a
right to participate in the proceeds from the published work (2.5% of each copy sold above a certain
threshold). EUROPE ECONOMICS, LUCIE GUIBAULT AND OLIVIA SALAMANCA, REMUNERATION OF
AUTHORS OF BOOKS AND SCIENTIFIC JOURNALS, TRANSLATORS, JOURNALISTS AND VISUAL ARTISTS FOR
THE USE OF THEIR WORKS 87-88 (A study prepared for the European Commission DG Communications
Networks,
Content
&
Technology,
Sep.
2016),
https://ec.europa.eu/digital-singlemarket/en/news/commission-study-remuneration-authors-books-and-scientific-jou=rnals-translatorsjournalists-and [https://perma.cc/A58Y-2EWZ].
87 CODE DE LA PROPRIÉTÉ INTELLECTUELLE [CPI] [Intellectual Property Code] arts. L.122-7 - L.
131-4 (Fr.), available in English at www.legifrance.gouv.fr [hereinafter FRENCH INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY CODE]. See also, Tristan Azzi, General report: Mechanisms to ensure adequate
remuneration for creators and performers, in REMUNERATION FOR THE USE OF WORKS: EXCLUSIVITY
VS. OTHER APPROACHES, 90-92 (Silke von Lewinski ed., 2017). MARIAN HEBB & WARREN SHEFFER,
TOWARDS A FAIR DEAL CONTRACTS AND CANADIAN CREATORS’ RIGHTS 28 (Creators’ Copyright
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policy instrument is that authors should be given a share of the profit and
success of their work.88
In France, for example, the author’s right to proportional remuneration
governs all copyright contracts made for consideration, irrespective of the
modes of commercial exploitation.89 The legislator does not fix the
percentage due to the author, and it is generally up to the discretion of the
parties to determine the exact royalty rate to be paid, ex ante, on the
condition that it is not paltry.90 Where no specific rate is specified, the law
requires that the intermediary provide the author with a proportional share
in the work’s success via royalties.91
Where the remuneration stipulated in the contract is ruled to be paltry,
the contract—or at least its provisions—may be declared void for lack of
due consideration.92 However, what constitutes paltry compensation is left
unelaborated. Only in relation to digital publishing does Article L. 132-176 of the France Code provide that a publishing contract “guarantees to the
author a fair and equitable remuneration right on all of the receipts coming
from the marketing and the diffusion of a book published in digital form.”93

Coalition, And the Creators’ Rights Alliance/ Alliance Pour Les Droits Des Créateurs 2006),
http://www.Creatorscopyright.Ca/Documents/Contracts-Study.Pdf.
88 See Theodoros Chiou, On Royalties and Transfers Without (Monetary) Consideration—Looking
for the “Magic Formula” for Assessing the Validity of Remuneration Clauses of Copyright Transfers
Under French Copyright Law, 44 ICC 585, 5889 (2013); Andre Lucas, Pascal Kamina & Robert
Plaisant, France in 1 INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE FRA §4 (Paul Edward Geller
ed.) § 4[3][b] (2017) (“The rationale behind this reform was to protect authors who might otherwise be
tempted to alienate valuable rights for the illusory bait of lump-sum payment.”). See also, NICOLAS
BOUCHE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW IN FRANCE, 75 (Klower Law Int’l 2011).
89 Article L. 122-7 provides that “[t]he right of performance and the right of reproduction can be
transferred, with or without payment.” Furthermore, art. L122-7§1 provides that “[t]he author is free to
put his work at the disposal of the public, on condition that he respects the rights of possible coauthors
and third parties, and that he acts in accordance with the agreements he has entered into.” Thus,
theoretically the parties may opt for either a free transfer of rights, or, a transfer providing the author
non-monetary consideration. Although the implication of these provisions alongside the obligation to
provide the author with proportional remuneration is not entirely clear. See FRENCH INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY CODE, supra note 87; Chiou, supra note 88, at 590-92.
90 PASCAL, supra note 9 at 202-04; BOUCHE, supra note 88, at 74-5.
91 The “basis of remuneration” (“assiette de rémunération”) must be calculated taking into account:
(1) either the price actually paid by the public for access to the work (“the public sale price”) or (2) the
income derived from its operation, whichever is most favorable to the author. Accordingly, the Court of
Cassation has traditionally held that the basis for calculating the royalty is calculated on the basis of the
sale price to the public, excluding VAT. See Court of Cassation, Civil Chamber 1 – 16th July 1998;
Court of Cassation, Civil Chamber 1, 9 October 1984; see also Jean-Baptiste Auroux, infra note 94
§ 15:31-32; See EUROPE ECONOMICS, supra note 86, at 32-34.
92 The author also has a right of access to financial information enabling them to know the financial
basis of their right to proportional remuneration. See Chiou, supra note 88, at 589-90.
93 LIONEL BENTLY ET AL., STRENGTHENING THE POSITION OF PRESS PUBLISHERS AND AUTHORS
AND PERFORMERS IN THE COPYRIGHT DIRECTIVE 58 (Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs,
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In effect, courts often refer to commercial customs or practices to
evaluate the adequacy of remuneration.94 For instance, a 0.5% royalty may
have been held satisfactory in the case of a film, but a 2.5% royalty rate
was ruled as inadequate for a publishing contract.95 Resulting in a de facto
sector-specific floor. In general, the principle of proportionality has been
devised to counter the practice of lump-sum remuneration.96 Therefore,
lump-sum agreements are now void with the exception of certain cases
specified in the legislation, such as circumstances where it is impossible to
provide the author with a share of the proceeds.97
C. Minimum Royalty Rate
On July 31, 2013, the Israeli legislature introduced the Law for the
Protection of Literature and Authors in Israel.98 The legislation intended to
“ensure Israeli authors proper remuneration for their creations”99 by
incorporating three key measures. First, it subjected newly published books
to price protection for a period of eighteen months, starting from the date of
initial publication.100 Second, its limited bookstores’ and publishers’
commercial activities.101 Third, it mandated a certain level of remuneration
to authors. 102 While the first two measures were mainly aimed to break up

Policy Department ed., 2017), https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2017/596810/
IPOL_STU%282017%29596810_EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZUW2-7H9T].
94 See Jean-Baptiste Auroux, Statutory or other rules regarding remuneration for authors and
performing artists in 2 COPYRIGHT THROUGHOUT THE WORLD § 15:32 (Silke von Lewinski ed.) (2015)
(citing CA Paris, Feb. 28, 2003, Comm. com. électr. 2003, No. 68, comment Caron Ch.)
95 This minimum can vary depending on the industry. See generally Lucas, Kamina & Plaisant,
supra note 88, at §4[3][C].
96 Id., at § 4[3][b]; BOUCH, supra note 88, at 75.
97 See FRENCH INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CODE, supra note 87, Article L. 131-4, 131-6; Lucas,
Kamina & Plaisant supra note 88, at § 4[3][b]. Although not explicitly mentioned in the law, the Court
of Cassation has allowed lump-sum payment in cases of collective works. Finally, the author can ask
for the proportional remuneration to be converted into lump-sum annuities for a fixed time period.
Generally, when a lump-sum payment is permissible, the amount agreed upon need not to correlate to
the success of the work. Nevertheless, as will be further discussed in the next section, in certain
circumstances this lump-sum payment will be modified for the benefit of the author.
98 Law for the Protection of Literature, supra note 63. The law was designed to increase
competition between publishers and booksellers and to ensure authors are better compensated. Several
drafts preceded the final version of the law.
99 See id. at §1; see also Ron Ben-Menachem & Karen Elburg, Israel’s New Authors Act, HERZOG
FOX & NEEMAN (Jan. 28, 2014), http://unfolding.co.il/israels-new-authors-act/ [https://perma.cc/5LE8Z7ZP].
100 During this eighteen-month period, the book is sold at the retail price set by the publisher. See
Law for the Protection of Literature, supra note 63 at §§2, 4.
101 Id. §8.
102 Id. §3(a).
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the duopoly in the Israeli book market,103 the third and most relevant
measure for the purpose of this study affected the core of the contractual
relations between the author and the publisher—the amount of
remuneration paid to the author.104
Specifically, the Law for the Protection of Literature and Authors in
Israel determined that during the first eighteen-month period, the author
shall receive at least eight percent (8%) of the book’s list price (minus the
VAT) for the first 6,000 copies sold, and ten percent (10%) of the book’s
list price for any copies sold thereafter.105 For the seven years following the
initial eighteen-month period, the author would then receive no less than
sixteen percent (16%) of the actual payment received by the publisher for
the books. 106 Hence, the law set the minimum royalties that would be given
to authors.107
It should be pointed out that the law differentiated between first-time
authors and all others.108 Namely, the royalty rate for the first book should
not be lower than 80% of the rates stated above.109 This distinction was
designed to reduce the risk associated with first-time authors.110
Buy-out contracts were not categorically forbidden under the law.
Actually, it allowed the author and the publisher to set a lump-sum advance
while the author was writing the book. The publisher would then deduct
this amount from subsequent royalties.111
Additionally, there were several exceptions to the minimum royalty
requirements. These included: (1) research books written by Israeli authors
103 See Miriam Marcowitz-Bitton & Jacob Nussim, People of the Book and the Law of the Book:
The Law for the Protection of Literature and Authors in Israel, 31 Mehkarey Mishpat 223, 228 (2017)
(Isr.).
104 Authors’ ability to capture some of the revenues generated by their works is ordinarily dictated
by contractual arrangements between authors and publishers. However, the concentration in the Israeli
book market has led to fierce competition and high discount rates in book prices (in comparison to the
set price on the book). On one hand, these high discount rates benefit the consumers, as they were able
to enjoy a considerable decrease in book prices. On the other hand, because of their considerable market
power, the two dominant chains were able force publishers into offering them considerable discounts.
This caused a decrease in publishers’ ability to remunerate authors, translators, editors, and other
service providers. In consideration of the forgoing, the legislature hoped that should a minimum royalty
rate become statutory condition, it would help the authors. See Law for the Protection of Literature
(Explanatory Notes).
105 Law for the Protection of Literature, supra note 63 §3(a).
106 Id. §3(b).
107 Id. §3.
108 Id. §3(c).
109 Id. §3(c).
110 Given the difficulty to determine the value of a copyrighted work prior to commercialization.
See Marcowitz-Bitton & Nussim, supra note 103, at 231.
111 See Law for the Protection of Literature, supra note 63 §3(d).
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who undergo scientific scrutiny prior to their publication and are published
either on one’s own or in cooperation with a nonprofit institution;112 (2) a
book that is a work created by an employee;113 (3) a book made pursuant to
a commission, with respect to which it was agreed in writing between the
commissioning party and the author that the first owner of the copyright
therein shall be the commissioning party; and (4) a state-owned work.114
The law was initially enacted for a three-year trial period starting in
February 2014.115 However, Opponents of the Law refer to it harmful to
competition and claimed it increased book prices for the citizens.116 Indeed
an intense public debate eventually led to its revocation on May 22, 2016.117
Nevertheless, the discussion of minimum royalty rate is not without merit,
seeing that it is not inconceivable to think of a scenario in which an
intervention specifying a minimum rate to counter the imbalance in
bargaining power is once again adopted by policymakers.
Overall, the Law for the Protection of Literature and Authors in Israel
established a minimum royalty rate that governed author-publisher
contracts. This arrangement has no counterpart in other jurisdictions.

112

Id. at §3(f)(1).
Id. §3(f)(2).
114 Id. §3(f)(3).
115 See Law for the Protection of Literature, supra note 63, §43(a2).
116 Lahav Harkov, Cancellation of Law Which Increased Book Prices Moves Forward, THE
JERUSALEM
POST
(March
20,
2016),
www.jpost.com/Israel-News/Politics-AndDiplomacy/Cancellation-of-law-which-increased-book-prices-moves-forward-448574
[https://perma.cc/ZCC7-H83E].
117 The Minister of Culture and Sport nominated a public committee to examine the effect of the
proposed legislation. Among the issues addressed by the committee was the effect of the minimum
royalties on publishers and authors (first time authors in particular), the number of books published, and
the diversity in the market. For example, according to a survey done by the Israel Consumer Council,
38% of respondents said they bought fewer books over the year or none at all, compared to previous
years. Of those, 46% stated it was because of high prices or lack of sales. Approximately half of the
respondents said that over the past year they had bought fewer books—or none at all—by authors they
did not previously know, with 23% of those indicating it was because of high costs or lack of sales. The
members of the committee held varying opinions as to the effect of the legislation. Nevertheless, they
all recommended waiting until the end of the three-year period before determining whether the law was
able to achieve its goals. Moreover, they emphasized more data is necessary. See Annual Report on the
state of the Book Industry, A report submitted by the Advisory Committee to the Minister of Culture
and Sport, the Minister of Economy and the Knesset Education, Culture and Sport Committee 15
(March 2016) (in Hebrew), http://fs.knesset.gov.il/%5C20%5CCommittees%5C20_cs_bg_341671.docx
[https://perma.cc/YZ8E-NH5W]. Nevertheless, on May 22, 2016, the Israeli government decided to
revoke the law in light of its flaws. Law No. 2553, was passed by the Knesset on May 30, 2016. The
draft bill and explanatory notes were published as part of the Law for the Protection of Literature and
Authors in Israel (Temporary Provision), (Legislative Amendments), 5776–2016, HH (Knesset) No.
1044 p. 1016 (May 23, 2016), (Isr.). See also, Ron Ben-Menachem & Karen Elburg, Israel’s New
Authors Act, LEXOCOLOGY (Jan. 28, 2014), www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=00148cfe-eae1455b-96fd-93698702da3e [https://perma.cc/S6W4-WWY6].
113
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However, the right to equitable remuneration and proportional
remuneration mentioned earlier create comparable restrictions on the
parties’ freedom in determining the level and form of remuneration
stipulated in the contract. Indeed, although they do not by themselves
guarantee that some remuneration will be paid to the author, all three
arrangements involve two main features: (1) parties are either banned or
discouraged from adopting lump-sum payments; and (2) the legislation
restricts the parties’ freedom to set the compensation rate too low.
IV. EX-POST ADJUSTMENT MECHANISMS
The previous sections featured a group of interventions designed to
protect the economic interests of the author vis-à-vis the intermediary ex
ante. To do so, they either explicitly ban the use of lump-sum payments or
strongly encourage the parties to avoid them. When a transfer of rights in
exchange for a lump-sum payment does happen, several jurisdictions
consider ex post intervention necessary—particularly in situations where a
discrepancy between the compensation and the proceeds flowing from the
work occurs.
This Part surveys two instances of ex-post remuneration adjustment
mechanisms. The first provides the author with an opportunity to receive an
additional share of the revenues that stem from commercially successful
woks via success or best-seller clauses. The other provides visual artists
who maintain the copyrights in their works but sold the physical
embodiment of such works to receive additional compensation following a
subsequent sale of the work.
A. Success Clause
Success clauses, as the title suggests, provide the author with the right
to modify the remuneration stipulated in the contract when the intermediary
sees disproportional profits.118 This form of intervention—meant to protect
the author who could potentially fail to benefit from the exploitation of her
work—is common in European countries.119 However, the conditions under
which an author may invoke her right of modification may differ from
country to country.
For instance, as noted previously, in France, the author has a right to
receive proportional remuneration under the Code.120 Nevertheless, if the
parties opt for a lump-sum payment where a specific exception applies, the
118 Thomas Dysart, Author-Protective Rules and Alternative Licenses: A Review of the Dutch
Copyright Contract Act, 37 E.I.P.R. 601, 605 (2015).
119 William Cornish, The Author as Risk-Sharer, 26 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 1, 12 (2002).
120 See supra note 91.
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legislation provides the author with a non-waivable right to modification or
adjustment of the amount of remuneration stipulated in the contract. The
author may seek such modification only if: (1) she suffers a loss of more
than seven-twelfths the compensation to which she was entitled; and (2) the
loss results from either “a burdensome contract or an insufficient advance
estimate of the proceeds of the works.”121
German copyright law likewise prescribes authors with a right to ask
for a modification of the contract.122 In the past, to claim modification the
author had to demonstrate that her remuneration is grossly
disproportionate.123 However, as part of the 2002 amendment to the
Copyright Act, the legislature introduced the new success rule.124
The new “success rule” is based on the former best-seller clause, and
likewise, aims to safeguard authors’ fair share of the proceeds.125
Nonetheless, under the new rule the threshold for asking for a modification
of the compensation is lower in comparison to the formed best-seller clause
in two respects. First, no longer is the author required to demonstrate
“gross disproportionality” between her remuneration, and the returns and
benefits of the intermediary.126 Rather, it is enough for the author to show
“a conspicuous disproportionality.”127 Another major difference between
the previous bestseller rule and the amended Section 32(a) is that the new
provision clearly states that the author is entitled to ask for a modification

121 FRENCH INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CODE, supra note 87, Article L. 131-5; LUCIE GUIBAULT &
BERNT HUGENHOLTZ, STUDY ON THE CONDITIONS APPLICABLE TO CONTRACTS RELATING TO
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION, at 32-33, 40, 72 (Information Law Institute,
University of Amsterdam, Final Report, Study Contract No. ETD/2000/B5–3001/E/69, 2002).
http://dare.uva.nl/document/2/24667 [https://perma.cc/5TEN-E7RS].
122 See GERMAN COPYRIGHT ACT, supra note 72, Article 32(a).
123 The so-called “bestseller clause” was meant to “secure for the author a fair share of the income
having regard to the circumstances.” See GUIBAULT & HUGENHOLTZ, supra note 121, at 82.
124 See GERMAN COPYRIGHT ACT, supra note 72, Article 32(a)(1). Although, the old bestseller rule
remains in force with regard to cases from before March 28, 2002. The main reason for the introduction
of this new success clause is that courts were reluctant to find that the remuneration agreed upon
between the parties was grossly disproportionate under the old provision. See Senftleben, supra note 59,
at 50-54; GUIBAULT & HUGENHOLTZ, supra note 121, at 80-81.
125 The German legislature found it to be unfair to exclude the author, to whom the current right
holder owes her success, from a share of the revenue. See Nordemann, supra note 64, at 1045.
126 See Gutsche, supra note 70, at 264; Senftleben, supra note 59 (claiming the requirement if for
the remuneration to equals less than half of the income she could have anticipated in view of the work
success).
127 The requirement is to show “auffälligen Missverhältnis” (conspicuous disproportionality) as
opposed to showing of “groben Missverhältnis” (gross disproportionality) under the former best-seller
clause. See GERMAN COPYRIGHT ACT, supra note 72, Article 32a(1); Salokannel, supra note 71, at 32.
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of the contract whether the disproportionality could have been foreseen at
the time of contract conclusion, or not.128
Given the protection these policies provide authors and their extensive
implications, the German legislature anticipated attempts to circumvent
them. Therefore, authors’ right to modification cannot be waived in
advance, nor can any disposition regarding the expected benefit be
effective. Moreover, this right applies to all modes of exploitation, and any
part in the contract deviating from this right is considered null and void.129
That said, the contract does remain valid following a request for
modification.130
Authors’ right to modify contract terms is mainly enforceable against
authors’ direct contracting party.131 Nevertheless, because it is common for
the original transferee to enter into subsequent contracts, the German
Copyright Act not only provides the author with the ability to assert her
rights against contracting partners, but also to enforce her rights against a
third party with whom the author has no direct contractual relationships.132
Finally, it is important to distinguish the right to ask for a modification
of the contract, pursuant to Section 32(a) of the German Copyright Act,
from the right to ask for a modification of the contract pursuant to Section
32 (i.e., violation of the author’s right to equitable remuneration).133 The
latter depends on an ex-ante assessment of the remuneration, namely

128 Senftleben, supra note 59; see also Salokannel, supra note 71, at 32; GUIBAULT &
HUGENHOLTZ, supra note 121, at 80.
129 Mainly in order to prevent the stronger party (i.e., the intermediary) from forcing the author to
assign or waive their right to modification in a contract. See GERMAN COPYRIGHT ACT, supra note 72,
Article 32a(2); Salokannel, supra note 71, at 34-46; Gruenberger & Dietz supra note 84, at §4[3][a][i].
130 See Gutsche, supra note 70, at 261-62. It is important to note that the author may not ask for a
modification of the contract if the remuneration has been determined by a collective agreement or in
accordance with joint remuneration scheme and “explicitly provides for further equitable participation.”
See GERMAN COPYRIGHT ACT, supra note 72, Article 32a(4); see also, GUIBAULT & HUGENHOLTZ,
supra note 121, at 82.
131 To assert a possible claim to remuneration, the author needs information about the revenue
generated from exploitation of the work. Article 32a grants her such right. See, e.g., Das Boot (the Boat)
Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Sept. 22, 2011, I ZR 127/10, GRUR 2012, 496
(Ger.).
132 Because the major part of the proceeds may be at the hands of the third party, if the third party
is liable, then the direct (original) contracting party is not liable. GERMAN COPYRIGHT ACT, supra note
72, Article 32a(2). For such third party liability to arise, the following conditions must be met: (1) the
author receives a conspicuously disproportionate monetary compensation; (2) the party to the original
contract transferred the exploitation rights to a third party; and (3) the conspicuous disproportion
resulted from returns gained by that third party. Salokannel, supra note 71, at 32-33.
133 See GERMAN COPYRIGHT ACT, supra note 72, and accompanying text.
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whether it is equitable. The former is applicable where the agreed
remuneration turns out to be ex-post disproportional.134
In sum, there are a few significant distinctions between the conditions
governing the right to modify the contract in France and Germany.
However, in both instances, the legislatures oblige the parties to revisit and
change the terms of the agreed upon profit-sharing arrangement when the
royalty rate is disproportionately low. Consequently, author is prevented
from fully transferring the risk associated with the exploitation of the work
to the intermediary, namely, the counterparty.
European endeavors in this regard are continuing. In fact, Article 20
of the EU’s new Directive on copyright and related rights in the Digital
Single Market requires Member States to introduce into their national
legislation a contract adjustment mechanism.135 Accordingly, an author
shall be entitled to claim additional, appropriate, and fair remuneration for
the exploitation of her rights, when the initially agreed remuneration “turns
out to be disproportionately low compared to all the subsequent relevant
revenues derived from the exploitation of the works or performances.”136
This recent initiative serves to emphasize the importance of adjustment
mechanisms in the European Union, both as a policy tool and for purposes
of critical discussion.
B. “Droit de Suite”—Artists’ Resale Royalties Right
Analogous to the aforementioned contract adjustment instruments, the
institution of droit de suite—artists’ resale royalty rights—entitles creators
of a visual artwork137 to a share option of the future stream of revenues
generated by her work.138

134 It appears as if the legislature had doubts over the ability of an ex ante measure alone to assure
adequate remuneration to the authors from an ex post perspective. Thus, this two-phase model was
thought to be an appropriate solution. See Christian Jansen, Economic Effect of the New German
Copyright Contract Law 5, (University Library of Munich, Germany, Law and Economics, 2003),
https://ideas.repec.org/p/wpa/wuwple/0302003.html#cites [https://perma.cc/2MLX-H5QP].
135 Directive (EU) 2019/790 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 on
copyright and related rights in the Digital Single Market and amending Directives 96/9/EC and
2001/29/EC (L130) 92, 122.
136 Id.
137 The creators include painters, sculptors, and photographers.
138 The term “droit de suite” (literally translated to the “right of following up”) is drawn from
French real property law and represents one’s continued possession of rights despite changes in
ownership. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, DROIT DE SUITE: THE ARTIST’S RESALE ROYALTY 7 (1992),
https://www.copyright.gov/history/droit_de_suite.pdf [https://perma.cc/N5R7-H8YF].
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Visual artists’ right to participate in or follow the proceeds from the
resale of their work was first implemented in France in 1920.139 It stemmed
from legislative concerns for the financial interests of visual artists whose
works are initially sold for a low price and then resold by the purchaser for
a much higher price.140 When this happens, artists cannot benefit from the
increase in the value of their work.141 According to this line of thinking,
creators are doomed to live a life of poverty, whereas the rapacious
intermediaries become even wealthier.142 The concern for the artists’
pecuniary interests is eminent given the particulars of the art market and
the peculiar nature of visual works of art. Art markets can be roughly
divided into two distinct sectors: primary and secondary. The primary art
market is where artists sell their works for the first time. And it is therefore
their main source of income. In the secondary market, intermediaries (e.g.,
dealers, galleries, auction houses, etc.) sell or trade the works again.
Although the prices at the secondary market frequently outrun those on the
primary market, for the vast majority of artists, the secondary market is
immaterial.143
To make matters worse, the literature suggests that visual artists are
under-protected by current copyright laws simply because of the nature of
their works.144 It has something to do with the fact that an author of a
literary work gains most of her monetary proceeds from the reproduction
and distribution of copies, while a visual artist derives financial benefits
only through the sale of the actual and original artwork. For instance, a

139 For a detailed discussion of the history of the Droit de Suite, see generally, Francois Hepp,
Royalties from Works of the Fine Arts: Origin of The Concept of Droit De Suite in Copyright Law, 6
BULL. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y 91 (1959).
140 Diane B. Schulder, Art Proceeds Act: A Study of Droit de Suite and a Proposed Enactment for
the United States, 61 NW. U. L. REV. 19, 24-25 (1966-1967); Michael B. Reddy, The Droit de Suite:
Why American Fine Artists Should Have a Right to a Resale Royalty, 15 LOY. L. A. ENT. L. REV. 509,
515 (1995).
141 Donald M. Millinger, Copyright and the Fine Artist, 48 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 354, 376 (1980).
142 The names of artists such as Millet, Dégas, and Bollin were invoked to support this pathos. See,
e.g., LILLIANE DE PIERREDON-FAWCETT, THE DROIT DE SUITE IN LITERARY AND ARTISTIC PROPERTY:
A COMPARATIVE LAW STUDY 1, 4 (Louise-Martin-Valiqueet trans., 1991); Stephanie B. Turner, The
Artist’s Resale Royalty Right: Overcoming the Information Problem, 19 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 329, 335
(2012); Sam Ricketson, Proposed International Treaty on Droit de Suite/Resale Royalty Right for
Visual Artists 8-9 (2015).
143 See Jeffrey C. Wu, Art Resale Rights and the Art Resale Market: A Follow-Up Study, 46 J.
COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 531, 543-44 (1999).
144 Rita E. Hauser, The French Droit de Suite: The Problem of Protection for the Underprivileged
Artist under the Copyright Law, 6 BULL. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 94, 94-95 (1959); see also Reddy,
supra note 140, at 513.
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copy of a book is usually regarded as having the same value as every other
copy. However, in the case of visual artwork, that is simply not the case.145
Legislators perceived the right to royalties as a necessary element in
the transition from direct state support for visual artists to a free market,
designed to maintain some protection for artists.146 The goal is to benefit
artists by overcoming the asymmetric bargaining power and information
they face, as well as to eliminate certain distinctions between visual artists
and other types of authors.147 In fact, since the 1920s, several international
and multinational treaties have incorporated artists’ royalty rights,148
including in more than 80 jurisdictions such as member states of the
European Union,149 Australia, and the state of California.150 Although artist
royalty rights schemes vary in both nature and scope from country to
country, the fundamental elements remain largely the same.151 Specifically,
these efforts grant an artist the right to participate in an increase in the
value of her work derived from subsequent sales.
These schemes normally set a minimum resale price to trigger the
royalty payment. Thus, the author is entitled to a resale royalty only when
the resale price exceeds the floor set by the legislation.152 The thresholds
vary among jurisdictions. For example, Directive 2001/84/EC and its
provisions regarding resale royalty rights exclude resales made three years
145 Physical embodiment is valuable precisely because there is no other object quite like the
original.
146 David Booton, A Critical Analysis of the European Commission’s Proposal for a Directive
Harmonizing the Droit de Suite, 2 INTELL. PROPERTY Q. 165, 183 (1998).
147 Contra Guy A. Rub, The Unconvincing Case for Resale Royalties, 124 YALE L.J. F. 1, 3 (2014)
(claiming “visual artists do not seem to typically be in a poor bargaining position”).
148 See Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works art. 14ter, Sept. 9, 1866,
S. Treaty Doc. No. 99-27 (as revised at Paris on July 24, 1971 and amended in 1979).
149 Resale royalty rights became mandatory as of January 1, 2006 for countries of the European
Union, which already had implemented them in their national legislation and as of January 1, 2010, for
all other member states. See Directive 2001/84/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27
September 2001 on the Resale Right for the Benefit of the Author of an Original Work of Art, 2001
O.J. (L 272) 32.
150 For a precise list, see Ricketson, supra note 142, at 10.
151 Some commentators suggested the droit de suite is more common in countries of the authors’
rights tradition because it functions as an adjunct to artists’ moral rights. See, e.g., Thomas M. Goetzl &
Stuart A. Sutton, Copyright and the Visual Artist’s Display Right: A New Doctrinal Analysis, 9 COLUM.
J. ART & L. 15, 19 (1984); Marina Santillini, United States’ Moral Rights Developments in European
Perspective, 1 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 89, 106-07 (1997). However, the UK adopted these rights
as part of the harmonization of laws in the EU. Additionally, the state of California has implemented the
“California Resale Royalty Act of 1976.” Under the Act, artists have a right to receive a five-percent
royalty on any resale of their work, unless they have expressly waived the right. CAL. CIV. CODE § 986
(West 2014). Not only that, but Georgia and South Dakota have enacted laws that include a narrow
version of resale royalty right provisions applicable only to artwork financed under state law. See GA.
CODE ANN. § 8-5-7 (West 2012); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 1-22-16(5) to (6) (2012).
152 Ricketson, supra note 142, at 44.
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after the initial purchase where the resale price does not exceed 3,000
euros.153 It represents a compromise between the desire to have as many
artists as possible enjoy the benefits of resale royalty rights while taking
into consideration transaction costs.154
The sums payable to the artist are commonly calculated on a
digressive scale. In which case, the higher the price on resale, the lower the
percentage of royalties applied. The resale royalty right cannot be licensed,
assigned or waived and will remain with the artist even if the copyright in
the work is transferred to a third party.155 On the other hand, the resale
royalty system is inherited, and thus, retained by the artist’s family after
death.156
Notably, the difficulty to monitor and administer royalties based on an
increase in value has led most countries to adopt specific restrictions on
resale royalty rights. For instance, in many jurisdictions resale royalty
rights apply only to subsequent sales made by non-private or commercial
parties, such as those through auction houses, art galleries and professional
dealers.157
In sum, both success clauses and royalty resale rights create an
opportunity for authors and visual artists to receive continued financial
recompense for their work. To this end, these adjustment mechanisms
attempt to rectify the disparity in bargaining positions between the authors
(and artists) and their counterparties by assuring that the author (or at least
the author’s family) will profit if the work becomes highly successful long
after a contract is concluded.
V. RIGHT REVERSION
Long-term copyright contracts offer several benefits to the parties.
Indeed, it is quite common for authors to transfer their rights for long

153 Directive 2001/84/EC, supra note 149, at art. 4. However, beyond that, the minimum price is
left to the discretion of the member states.
154 The very same notion of transaction costs has led several jurisdictions to require artists to
transfer their rights to a collecting agency or society to collect royalties. See Olav Velthuis, Art Markets,
in A HANDBOOK OF CULTURAL ECONOMICS 33, 35-36 (Ruth Towse ed., 2d ed. 2011).
155 Ricketson, supra note 142 at 39-40; U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, RESALE ROYALTIES: AN
UPDATED ANALYSIS 17 (Dec. 2013), http://copyright.gov/docs/resaleroyalty/usco-resaleroyalty.pdf
[https://perma.cc/693H-PB5].
156 Allison Schten, No More Starving Artists: Why the Art Market Needs a Universal Artist Resale
Royalty Right, 7 NOTRE DAME J. INT’L COMP. L. 115, 118 (2017) (the resale royalty rights system
allows the artist or heirs to reap the financial benefits that are attached to the work).
157 Id.
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periods, often even for the entire term of the copyright.158 Yet, as time
passes, transferees may no longer be interested in exploiting a work or
certain rights. They may even be unable to do so. Consequently, many
works remain underexploited and unavailable for use.159 Even when the
work remains commercially available, the legislature may deem it
necessary to protect authors (and their heirs) from the results of early
contracts concluded under unequal bargaining settings. This is where the
idea of right reversion becomes useful.
Right reversion, or early termination, provisions are as old as
the Statute of Anne from 1710.160 This English statute created a two-term
system of copyright protection. Even when the author transferred the first
term, the second term re-vested with her or her heirs, so long as the author
lived through the first term, giving her an opportunity to strike a better
agreement with the publisher and benefit from the success of the work.161
Since then, copyright law has changed considerably in the U.K., replacing
the bifurcated term of protection with a single one. Consequently,
reversionary provisions have been repealed.162 Nevertheless, some form of
reversionary rights persist in other jurisdictions, namely in the U.S. and
Canada.163 These provisions may differ from one another in several
respects, including duration, formalities and the identity of the beneficiary.
But some essential elements are comparable. Chief among them is the
underlying aspiration to protect the author—who frequently transfers her
rights to an intermediary before the value of the work can be known—from
an inauspicious bargain by providing an opportunity for the author and/or

158

See DUSOLLIER ET AL., supra note 46, at 28 (Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs, Policy
Department ed., 2014), www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/etudes/join/2014/493041/IPOLJURI_ET(2014)493041_EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/L9C3-TYSF].
159 Martin Kretschmer, Short Paper: Copyright Term Reversion and the “Use It or Lose It”
Principle, 1 INT’L J. MUSIC BUS. RES. 44, 46, 49-50 (2012); Deirdre K. Mulligan & Jason M. Schultz,
Neglecting the National Memory: How Copyright Term Extensions Compromise the Development of
Digital Archives, 4 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 451, 462 (2002) (showing that out of 10,027 books
published in the United States in 1930, all but 174 were out of print in 2001).
160 Act for the Encouragement of Learning (Statute of Anne), 8 Ann., c. 19, § 11 (1710) (Gr. Brit.);
see also, Lionel Bently & Jane C. Ginsburg, The Sole Right . . . Shall Return to the Authors: AngloAmerican Authors’ Reversion Rights from the Statute of Anne to Contemporary U.S. Copyright, 25
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1475, 1478-80 (2010).
161 Bently & Ginsburg, supra note 160, at 1485-1486; Cf. Frank R. Curtis, Protecting Authors in
Copyright Transfers: Revision Bill §203 and the Alternatives, 72 COLUM. L. REV. 799, 802 (1972);
MARK ROSE, AUTHORS AND OWNERS: THE INVENTION OF COPYRIGHT 42-48 (1993).
162 An Act to Amend Several Acts for the Encouragement of Learning, 54 Geo 3, c. 156, § 4 (Gr.
Brit. and British Empire). See also, Lionel Bently, R v. The Author from the Death Penalty to
Community Service, 32 COLUM. J.L. ARTS. 1, 66-71 (2008).
163 17 U.S.C. §§ 203(a), 304(c)-(d) (2012); Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-42 §14 (1985)
[hereinafter Canadian Copyright Act].
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her heirs to recapture copyrights and to attract a larger share of the
profits.164
A. Termination Rights
Congress passed a comprehensive revision of the 1909 Copyright Act
in 1976.165 Among other things, the 1976 Copyright Act abandoned the
two-term scheme of copyright protection, adopting instead the international
one-term protection standard.166 Under this single-term copyright protection
system, the old reversion of rights scheme could no longer exist.167
However, “[i]n abandoning the renewal copyright, Congress did not intend
to deprive authors of the right they had always had to recapture their rights
years after their works were originally exploited.”168 Recognizing the need
both to provide authors with a safeguard against unfair undervaluation and
to avoid the difficulties encountered under the 1909 Copyright Act,
Congress implemented a new reversionary system and introduced two
termination provisions in the 1976 Copyright Act, codified at 17 U.S.C.
Sections 203 and 304.169

164 ARTHUR FISHER & THE COPYRIGHT SOCIETY OF THE U.S.A., STUDIES ON COPYRIGHT, 188
(Arthur Fisher memorial ed. 1963) (noting that this feature has been criticized as paternalistic and in
conflict with the freedom of contracts); Lydia Pallas Loren, Renegotiating the Copyright Deal in the
Shadow of the “Inalienable” Right to Terminate, 62 FLA. L. REV. 1329, 1330 (2010).
165 Melville B. Nimmer, Termination of Transfers Under the Copyright Act of 1976, 125 U. PA. L.
REV. 947, 950-51 (1977).
166 See Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, tit. I, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998). At that
time, the term of protection was life of the author plus fifty years. In 1998, Congress extended the term
of protection to life of the author plus seventy years.
167 That is, for works created after January 1, 1978. See Nimmer, supra note 165, at 951; STUDY
NO. 31, COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION, STUDIES PREPARED FOR THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON PATENTS,
TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY UNITED STATES SENATE,
86TH CONG., 125-26 (2D SESS. Comm. Print 1961), http://copyright.gov/history/studies/study31.pdf
[https://perma.cc/DRQ8-JUXZ]. It is important to note that later revisions of the Copyright Act
abolished the renewal right for works created both before and after January 1, 1978. See Robert A.
Kreiss, Abandoning Copyrights to Try to Cut Off Termination Rights, 58 MO. L. REV 85, 101 (1993).
168
SOUND RECORDINGS AS WORKS MADE FOR HIRE: HEARING BEFORE THE SUBCOMM. ON
COURTS AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OF THE H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 106th Cong. (2000),
http://www.copyright.gov/docs/regstat52500.html [https://perma.cc/SNH@-UMQB] (statement of
Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyright, U.S. Copyright Office) (expressing the importance of
termination rights).
169 H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 124, 140 (1976) (“The provisions of section 203 are based on the
premise that the reversionary provisions of the present section on copyright renewal (17 U.S.C. sec. 24)
should be eliminated, and that the proposed law should substitute for them a provision safeguarding
authors against unremunerative transfer. . . . An issue underlying the 19-year extension of renewal terms
under both subsections (a) and (b) of section 304 is whether, in a case where their rights have already
been transferred, the author or the dependents of the author should be given a chance to benefit from the
extended term. The arguments for granting rights of termination are even more persuasive under section
304 than they are under section 203; the extended term represents a completely new property right, and
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Sections 203 and 304 equally redress the author’s lack of bargaining
power and the difficulty of foreseeing the future value of her work.170 Both
Sections grants an author or her statutory successors the right to terminate
valid copyright transfers under certain circumstances and subsequently
recapture her rights, effectively providing the author a second chance to
recapture some of the value from her work by placing her in a better
position to renegotiate a better deal.171
Section 203 provides authors the right to terminate transfers made by
the author in works created on or after January 1, 1978172 thirty-five to forty
years after the execution of the grant.173 Section 304, on the other hand,
provides an author with the right to terminate grants executed by the author
or her statutory successors before January 1, 1978.174
For termination to take effect under both Section 203 and Section 304,
the author or her statutory successors175 must file a notice of termination

there are strong reasons for giving the author, who is the fundamental beneficiary of copyright under the
Constitution, an opportunity to share in it.”).
170 Guy A. Rub acknowledges that, historically, the two main justifications for inalienable
termination rights are rooted in (1) the romantic view of the author as the weak, unsophisticated party;
and (2) Congress’s concern with the uncertain future value of work of authorship. However, Rub
questions why these concerns should justify an inalienable termination mechanism. See Rub, supra note
7, at 78-88.
171 17 U.S.C. §§ 203(a), 304(c)-(d) (2012). Amy Gilbert, The Time Has Come: A Proposed
Revision to 17 U.S.C. § 203, 66 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 807, 828 (2016). Many of the features of the
current termination right are the result of Section 23 of the 1909 Copyright Act. The 1909 Act
bifurcated the copyright term of protection into two distinct periods, each spanning twenty-eight years
in length. For a work to remain protected after the first term, the copyright had to be “renewed” at its
end. This aspect of the law functioned not only to enlarge the public domain, but also, “to protect the
author and his family against his unprofitable or improvident disposition of the copyright.” STAFF OF H.
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 87TH CONG., REP. OF THE REG. OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION
OF
THE
U.S.
COPYRIGHT
LAW
92
(Comm.
Print
1961),
http://www.copyright.gov/history/1961_registers_report.pdf [perma.cc/33KP-89A6]. Unfortunately,
this reversionary aspect of renewal failed to accomplish its primary purpose. See Anthony R. Reese,
Note, Reflections on the Intellectual Commons: Two Perspectives on Copyright Duration and
Reversion, 47 STAN. L. REV. 707 (1995); Fred Fisher Music Co. v. M. Witmark & Sons, 318 U.S. 643
(1943); Sidney J. Brown, Renewal Rights in Copyright, 28 CORNELL L.Q. 460 (1942). See H.R. REP.
NO. 94-1476, at 124, 140 (1976).
17217 U.S.C. § 203.
173 The exception to this rule is when the grant covers the right of publication. In this case, the
author or her statutory successors may terminate thirty-five to forty years from the date of publication
or forty to forty-five years from the date of the execution of the grant, whichever term ends earlier. See
17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(3).
174 See 17 U.S.C. § 304. See also Loren, supra note 164, at 1333.
175 It is important to note that The Copyright Act lists the statutory successors regardless of the
author’s wishes. See Broad. Music, Inc. v. Roger Miller Music, Inc., 396 F.3d 762, 771 (6th Cir. 2005);
Music Sales Corp. v. Morris, 73 F. Supp. 2d 364, 374 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (quoting Miller Music Corp. v.
Charles N. Daniels, Inc., 362 U.S. 373 (1960) and Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207 (1990)). Cf. Lee-ford
Tritt, Liberating Estates Law from the Constraints of Copyright, 38 RUTGERS L.J. 109 (2006)
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within a certain timeframe.176 If no action is taken to terminate the transfer
within the statutory timeframe, the original assignee or his or her
successors may continue to exploit the work under the terms of the original
agreement for the remainder of the term.177
To prevent the intermediary from using his superior bargaining
position to frustrate the purpose of termination rights, Congress explicitly
decided to make the right to terminate inalienable.178 In addition, the
Copyright Act invalidated any “grant, or agreement to make a further
grant” of reversionary rights made prior to the effective date of
termination.179 There is one important exception to this rule. The original
transferee and the author or her statutory successors are able to enter into a
new agreement to transfer the copyrights, after notice of termination has
been served but before the effective date of termination, only.180 Hence, the
Copyright Act creates an exclusive window of opportunity for the original
transferee.181
In sum, the 1976 Act incorporates a powerful reversionary
mechanism, which takes effect thirty-five to forty years from the date of
(discussing and critiquing the way copyright law determines who ultimately has the right to profit from
the author’s works).
176 See 37 C.F.R. § 201.10; see also Nance v. Equinox Music, No. 09-cv-7808, 2010 WL 4340469,
at *3 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 22, 2010); Burroughs v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 491 F. Supp. 1320, 1325-26
(S.D.N.Y. 1980).
177 17 U.S.C. § 203(b)(6) (establishing that unless the agreement provides otherwise, the agreement
between the parties continues for the term of copyright).
178 17 U.S.C. §§ 203(a)(5), 304(c)(5), 304(d)(1). The Supreme Court has inferred from statutory
language that the right to terminate is inalienable. See Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207 (1990). Despite
the statute’s explicit language, it soon became evident that the exact meaning of the phrase “any
agreement to the contrary” is highly controversial. In Milne v. Stephen Slesinger, 430 F.3d 1036 (9th
Cir. 2005), the Ninth Circuit held that an agreement executed in 1930 was not subject to termination
under section 304(d) because the parties revoked it and substituted it with a new agreement in 1983. Id.
Similarly, in Penguin Group (USA) Inc. v. Steinbeck, 537 F.3d 193 (2d Cir. 2008), the Second Circuit
held that a 1994 agreement rescinded a 1938 agreement. See Peter S. Menell and David Nimmer, PoohPoohing Copyright Law’s “Inalienable” Termination Rights, 57 J. COPYRIGHT. SOC’Y U.S.A. 799
(2010) for detailed analyses of the difficulties arising out of the inalienability of the right.
179 17 U.S.C. §§ 203(b)(4), 304(c)(6)(D) (2018).
180 Id.
181 The right to terminate is subject to several exceptions. First, grants executed by a will. See 17
U.S.C. §§ 203(a), 304(c-d) (2018); see also, Larry Spier, Inc. v. Bourne Co., 750 Supp. 648, 651
(S.D.N.Y. 1990), rev’d on other grounds, 953 F.2d 774 (2d Cir. 1992). Second, existing derivative
works. 17 U.S.C. § 203(b) allows the continuing exploitation of existing derivative works under the
terms of the grant even after termination. See generally HOWARD B. ABRAMS, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT
§ 12:39 (2013); Howard B. Abrams, Who’s Sorry Now? Termination Rights and the Derivative Works
Exception, 62 U. DET. L. REV. 181, 204-23 (1985). See also Stewart, 495 U.S. 207 (1990). Last but not
least, works made for hire. 17 U.S.C. §§ 203(a), 304(c) (2018). Many questions regarding the
relationship between the work-made-for-hire doctrine and termination rights are bound to arise in the
coming years. See, e.g., Patrick Murray, Heroes-For-Hire: The Kryptonite to Termination Rights under
the Copyright Act of 1976, 23 SETON HALL J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 411 (2013).

189

NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

conclusion of a grant of rights.182 Section 203(a) only recently became
effective, and subsequently generated a string of high-profile cases.183
Perhaps the most famous case involved Victor Willis, the original lead
singer of the Village People, who successfully exercised his right to
terminate his grants of thirty-three musical compositions, including
“Y.M.C.A.”184 But, it is too early to assess the full distributional
consequences of this mechanism.
Although, U.S. termination rights constitute a unique legal
arrangement in the copyright landscape, it is interesting to note that on
December 23, 2016, the German parliament adopted a series of
amendments to its Copyright Act.185 The parliament designed these
amendments to further support the 2002 reform. They provided, inter alia,
a right to terminate an exclusive license ten years after either the granting
of the right or delivery, whichever occurs later, creating a ten-year
exclusivity period.186 Consequently, the license will be deemed nonexclusive and the author will be able to exploit the work either through a
different intermediary or on her own.
This provision, Article 40a, is specifically targeted at so-called “buyout” agreements, whereby the author transfers an exclusive “use right” for
the effective duration of copyright in consideration for one lump-sum
payment before the true commercial value of the work is known.187
Therefore, the Act provides that after a period of five years—during which
the author could learn more about the value of her work—the parties may
renegotiate the terms of the agreement and extend the exclusivity beyond
182

Bently & Ginsburg, supra note 160, at 1564.
Only in 2013 can termination of grants concluded in 1978 under section 203(a) occur (the 35th
anniversary of the grant).
184 Scorpio Music S.A. v. Willis, No. 11cv1557 BTM(RBB), 2012 WL 1598043, at *1 (S.D. Cal.
2012). See also Jorge L. Contreras & Andrew T. Hernacki, Copyright Termination and Technical
Standards, 43 U. BALT. L. REV. 221, 254 (2014); Stella Brown, It Takes a Village to Make a
Difference: Continuing the Spirit of Copyright, 12 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 129 (2014).
185 GESETZ ZUR VERBESSERTEN DURCHSETZUNG DES ANSPRUCHS DER URHEBER UND
AUSÜBENDEN KÜNSTLER AUF ANGEMESSENE VERGÜTUNG UND ZUR REGELUNG VON FRAGEN DER
VERLEGERBETEILIGUNG [Act to improve the enforcement of the right of the author and performing
artist to equitable remuneration and for dealing with matters of publisher participation], Dec. 20, 2016,
BGBI
I
at
3037
(Ger.),
http://www.bgbl.de/xaver/bgbl/start.xav?startbk=Bundesanzeiger_BGBl&jumpTo=bgbl116s3037.pdf.
The amendment took effect on March 1, 2017.
186 See GERMAN COPYRIGHT ACT, supra note 72, at Article 40a(3). Nevertheless, this Article
provides for several exceptions to the 10 years rules.
187 Germany prohibits assignment. See Andreas Rahmatian, Non-Assignability of Authors’ Rights
In Austria And Germany And Its Relation To The Concept Of Creativity In Civil Law Jurisdictions
Generally: A Comparison With U.K. Copyright Law, 5 ENT. L. REV. 95 (2000); Christopher M.
Newman, An Exclusive License Is Not an Assignment: Disentangling Divisibility and Transferability of
Ownership in Copyright, 74 LA. L. REV. 58, 95 (2013).
183
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the ten-year period. That said, the parties may agree to extend the
exclusivity period, or contract around it, when another form of
remuneration is employed. Article 40a could potentially add to the arsenal
of rights already available to authors for rescinding their rights.188
B. Reversionary Interests
Canada, like other countries that were part of the British
Commonwealth nations and territories, inherited the Imperial Copyright
Act of 1911.189 The Imperial Copyright Act bestowed the author and her
heirs with a reversionary right known as the “Dickens Provision,” which
was intended to complement the extension of copyright protection to fifty
years post mortem auctoris.190
In principle, the provision stipulated that where the author was the
first owner of the copyright and the rights were assigned, licensed or
otherwise transferred, the transfer did not vest with the transferee any rights
beyond twenty-five years after the death of the author.191 Hence,
irrespective of the terms of the contract, twenty-five years after the death of
the author, copyrights automatically revert to one’s heirs.192 Although
reversionary rights have been repealed in England and many of the former
commonwealth nations and territories, they remain in force in Canada and
have gone virtually unchanged since 1924.193
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Gruenberger & Dietz, supra note 84, at § 2.
See Copyright Act 1911, 1 & 2 Geo. 5 c. 46, art. 5(2) (U.K.).
190 Common wisdom suggests that the “Dickens Provision” was introduced into the copyright acts
of the UK and other British Commonwealth territories following a public outrage initiated by the fact
that the works of Charles Dickens were generating huge profits for publishing companies while his
family was left penniless. See Alan J. Hartnick, Stanley Rothenberg: Final Thoughts on The Dickens
Provision, 54 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 565 (2006). See also, Anne of Green Gables Licensing Auth.
Inc. v. Avonlea Traditions Inc., [2000] 4 CPR (4th) 289 (Ont SCJ); Ken Cavalier, Potential Problems
with Commonwealth Copyright for Posthumous Poets and other Dead Authors, 52 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y
U.S.A. 225, 231-32 (2005).
191 See Cavalier, supra note 190, at 231; Hartnick, supra note 190, at 566.
192 See, e.g., Provision 5(2) of the United Kingdom Copyright Act, 1911.
193 Canadian Copyright Act, supra note 163; see also Madam Justice Wilson in paragraph 83 of
Anne of Green Gables Licensing Authority v. Avonlea Traditions Inc. (2000) 4 CPR (4th) 289 (Ont
SCJ). Pursuant to the United Kingdom Copyright Act of 1956 and effective June 1, 1957, Section 5(2)
was repealed. See generally Daniel J. Gervais, A Canadian Copyright Narrative, 21 INT’L PROP. J.
(Can.) 269, 274 (2009); Ziad J. Katul, Once (Twice) in A Lifetime: Section 14(1) of the Copyright Act
Judicially Considered, 17 INTELL. PROP. J. 91, 96 (2003). For detailed discussion of why
commonwealth reversionary rights were repealed in the UK, Australia and New Zealand see Joshua
Yuvaraj and Rebecca Giblin, Why Were Commonwealth Reversionary Rights Abolished (And What Can
We Learn Where They Remain?, 41 EUROPEAN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REVIEW 232 (2019).
189
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There is little legislative support as to why Canada kept these
reversionary rights.194 Much like its predecessors, the Canadian right of
reversion provides the author’s heirs an opportunity to redress contractual
imbalances and a “relief against hardship suffered.”195 As stated by the
court in Chappell Music Co., Ltd. and Others v. Redwood Music, Ltd., the
legislative aim was “to safeguard authors and their heirs from the
consequences of any imprudent disposition which authors might make of
the fruits of their talent and originality.”196
Pursuant to Section 14 of the Canadian Copyright Act, a transfer of
copyrights made after June 4, 1921 in an agreement entered into by the
author, revert to the author’s estate twenty-five years after the death of the
author for the remaining period of copyright protection, notwithstanding
any agreement to the contrary made during the life of the author.197 That is,
any transfer of rights made by the author after June 4, 1921 will be
terminated twenty-five years after the author’s death. These rights will then
revert to the author’s estate and consequently, her heirs will receive an
opportunity to enjoy the benefits of such rights for the remaining twentyfive years of copyright protection.198
In the interest of the estate, the Canadian legislation explicitly
stipulated that the author cannot assign or license the reversionary interest
in an attempt to avoid the operation of the reversionary rights.199 Yet the
author’s heirs are able to exploit or negotiate the transfer of these rights and
may do so immediately upon the death of the author, that is, decades before
the reversion interest has vested.200 It was thought that an intermediary who
194 Bob Tarantino, Long Time Coming: Copyright Reversionary Interests in Canada, 375
DÉVELOPPEMENTS RÉCENTS EN DROIT DE LA PROPRIÉTÉ INTELLECTUELLE (Barreau du Québec;
Éditions Yvon Blais), 2 (August 16, 2013).
195 See Anne of Green Gables Licensing Authority v. Avonlea Traditions Inc., supra note 193.
196 Reference Lord Salmon’s words in Chappell Music Co., Ltd. and Others v. Redwood Music,
Ltd. and Another, 98 R.P.C 337, 344 (1981) [1980] 2 All E.R. 817 at 823 per Lord Salmon (H.L.). A
similar statement was made in Coleridge-Taylor v. Novello & Co. Ltd., [1983] 3 All E.R. 506, 514. See
also, COPINGER AND SKONE JAMES ON COPYRIGHT, 308 (Kevin Garnett, Gillian Davis & Gwilym
Harbottle eds., 16th ed. 2011) [hereinafter COPINGER AND SKONE]; Bently & Ginsburg, supra note 160,
at 1485-86.
197 See supra note 193 and accompanying text.
198 The term of copyright protection in Canada is currently the life of the author plus fifty years.
The reversionary rights last for a period that is a bit longer than twenty-five years but shorter than
twenty-six years. Reason being that, the reversionary period begins twenty-five years from the death of
the author, as opposed to the copyright term of protection, which is measured from the end of the
calendar year in which the author dies. See Canadian Copyright Act, supra note 163, at § 6.
199 DAVID VAVER, COPYRIGHT LAW, 110 (2000).
200 See COPINGER AND SKONE, supra note 196, at 130 (“This reversionary interest, then,
unassignable during the author’s lifetime, becomes an asset of the author’s estate and assignable
immediately upon his death.”). An alternative proposition will be to argue that, the reversionary interest
vest in the estate only twenty-five years after the death of the author. See J.C. Sonnekus, Reversionary
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collaborated with the author and her heirs and made efforts to effectively
exploit the work, “would have little to fear from reversion,”201 because the
estate would aspire to maintain the relationship with such intermediary
even after the reversion would take effect.202
For the reversionary interest to take effect, the author must be the first
or initial owner of the rights.203 In the absence of an agreement to the
contrary, the author is not the initial owner where: (1) the author was an
employee and the work was made in the course of employment;204 (2) the
author created an engraving, photograph or portrait and another person
ordered the original before November 7, 2012;205 or (3) Her Majesty or any
government department directed the preparation or publication of the work,
subject to an agreement with the author.206 Moreover, reversionary rights do
not apply to: (1) works for which the copyright protection is calculated by
references to some characteristic other than the life of the author;207 (2)
jointly authored works in which at least one of the authors is still alive;208
(3) transfers made by will; and (4) “assignment of the copyright in a
collective work or a license to publish a work or a part of the work as part
of a collective work.”209 Even if the work remains beyond the scope of the
abovementioned scenarios, when the heirs make no claim to the
reversionary rights, the transferee may continue to assert copyrights for the
twenty-five-year reversionary period.210 Additionally, although the
language of Section 14 does not explicitly require any form of notification
for the reversion of rights to take effect, commentators have suggested that
unauthorized uses by the transferee occurring after the date of reversion,
Interest in Musical Composition and the Administration of the Estate of a Deceased Composer, 122 S.
AFRICAN L.J. 464, 467-470 (2005); Tarantino, supra note 194, at 15.
201 See VAVER, supra note 199, at 110.
202 Id.
203 Although the Copyright Act points to the author as the first owner of copyright, it does not
define who the author is. In most cases, it will be the person creating the work; however, this is not
always the case. See generally JOHN S. MCKEOWN, FOX ON CANADIAN LAW OF COPYRIGHT AND
INDUSTRIAL DESIGNS 382-83 (3rd. ed. 2000) (hereinafter, MCKEOWN, FOX ON COPYRIGHT).
204 See Canadian Copyright Act, supra note 163, at § 13(3).
205 Commissioned engravings, photographs or portraits were subject to subsection 13(2) of the
Canadian Copyright Act prior to the Copyright Modernization Act in November 2012. Id.
206 See Canadian Copyright Act, supra note 163, at § 12.
207 Tarantino, supra note 194, at 4-5 (“posthumous works which are protected for fifty years from
the date of publication or public performance; sound recordings created prior to January 1, 1997, which
were protected for a period of fifty years from creation; or cinematographic works which possess no
“dramatic character” and which are protected for a period of fifty years from the later of the end of the
year of their creation or first publication.”).
208 Id. at 5.
209 See Canadian Copyright Act, supra note 163, at § 14(2).
210 See supra note 193 and accompanying text.
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but before the author’s heirs asserted their rights, “may be treated as noninfringing and impliedly licensed by the estate.”211
Section 60(2) of the Canadian Copyright Act establishes an additional
reversionary right. This right is applicable to works created prior to January
1, 1924, and which were still protected by previous copyright statutes.212
Though, for works created prior to January 1, 1924, right reversion takes
place seven years after the death of the author.213 Section 60(2) provides the
transferee who already may have invested considerable resources in the
work214 with the option to either preserve the exact rights enjoyed in the
work.215 Another possibility is to obtain non-exclusive reproduction rights,
subject to remuneration. When the transferee chooses to preserve the exact
rights she previously held but for the reversion, she must notify the author.
The Act requires the transferee to notify the heirs at least one year and no
less than six months prior to the date of reversion.216 When the notice is
provided in a timely manner, the transferee maintains the rights but must
remunerate the author’s heirs. The amount of the remuneration may be
agreed upon by the parties or determined by arbitration.217

211

Tarantino, supra note 194, at 14 (citing DAVID VAVER, COPYRIGHT LAW 113 (2000)).
Up until 1924, the copyright term of protection in Canada was the life of the author plus seven
years. However, the 1921 Act prolonged the term of protection to the life of the author plus fifty years.
Because many authors had already assigned most of their works before the amendment took effect, the
parliament therefore had to decide which party would gain the benefits of the extended term of
protection. To avoid creating an extension that is not particularly advantageous for authors, the
legislation provided that in the absence of express agreement, rights revert to the author’s heirs on the
date on which the pre-1924 rights would have expired, subject to specific rights reserved for the
transferee. Notably, Section 60(2) applies only to transfers made by the author before January 1, 1924
for the whole term of copyright, even when the rights were subsequently re-assigned by the transferee.
It does not apply, however, to transfers for a limited time. See MCKEOWN, FOX ON COPYRIGHT, supra
note 203, at § 33:5; HUGUES G. RICHARD & LAURENT CARRIÈRE, ROBIC COPY ANN. 60§5.0 (Westlaw).
213 For illustration, imagine a literary work created in 1900, the author of which died in 1940.
Under the pre-1924 copyright statutes, the copyright in the work would have expired in 1947. However,
in accordance with Section 60(2) of the 1921 Act, copyright in the work would revert to the authors’
heirs in 1947 (i.e., seven years after the death of the author) for the remaining term of protection (or
until 1990, the life of the author plus fifty years).
214 See MCKEOWN, FOX ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 203, at § 33:5.
215 See Canadian Copyright Act, supra note 163, at § 60(2)(a).
216 Id. at § 60(2).
217 The amount of the remuneration may be agreed upon by the parties or determined by
arbitration. Where the transferee fails to provide such notice, she may continue to reproduce or perform
the work in the same manner she was entitled to before the occurrence of the re-version. However, she
must remunerate the heirs of the author if the author demands such payment within three years prior to
the expiration of the rights under the previous law. The amount of remuneration again may be set by
agreement of the parties or through arbitration. The form of arbitration or calculation of the
remuneration mechanisms are not, however, set forth by the Copyright Act. See RICHARD & CARRIÈRE,
supra note 212, at 60§5.01.
212
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C. Revocation for non-exercise
As previously noted, there may be scenarios in which the intermediary
is unable or unwilling to exploit the rights. This might be because it is no
longer commercially profitable to do so, or because there has been a
deliberate decision to render the protected work obsolete—perhaps in favor
of a newer version. In any case, the result is that the work is no longer
available, although it is not necessarily without a demand. Consequently,
the dissemination of the work and the author’s stream of pecuniary benefits
are in jeopardy.218 This is where the idea of revocation of rights becomes
auspicious.219
Indeed, several European countries including Austria, Belgium, the
Netherlands, Germany, Luxemburg, the Nordic Countries, Portugal, and
Spain impose an obligation on transferees to genuinely exploit the rights
transferred.220 Where the transferee fails to carry out the aforesaid
obligation, the author may rescind the transfer (non usus or ‘use it or lose
it’ provisions).221
218

Maria Lillà Montagnani & Maurizio Borghi, Positive Copyright and Open Content Licenses:
How to Make a Marriage Work by Empowering Authors to Disseminate Their Creations, 12 INT’L J.
COMM. L. & POL’Y 244, 252-54 (2008).
219 This needs to be distinguished from the moral right to revoke a grant of right or to withdraw a
work from commercial exploitation (right of reconsideration). Lior Zemer, The Dual Message of Moral
Rights, 90 TEX. L. REV. 125 (2012).
220 Neil Netanel, Copyright Alienability Restrictions and the Enhancement of Author Autonomy: A
Normative Evaluation, 24 RUTGERS L.J. 347, 389 (1993) (discussing such obligations to exploit in the
context of restrictions on the alienability of copyrights). It is interesting to note that like in other
principal-agent relationships, this raises the question of imposing a “performance obligation” on the
agent. See Ronald I. Coffey, Firm Opportunities: Property Right Assignments, Firm Detriment, and the
Agent’s Performance Obligation, 13 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 155 (1988).
221 See GERMAN COPYRIGHT ACT, supra note 72, Article 41; FRENCH INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
CODE, supra note 87, Article L. 131-17. Wet auteurscontractenrecht van 30 juni 2015 [Copyright
Contract Act of June 30, 2015], Stb. 2015, 257, art. 25e translated in New Copyright Contract Law in
the Netherlands, VISSER SCHAAP & KREIJGER, http://www.ipmc.nl/en/topics/new-copyrightcontract-law-netherlands [https://perma.cc/XB4N-RH24] (amending the Dutch Copyright Act of 1912);
See also Edouard Fortunet, The Author’s Moral Right to Withdraw a Work (droit de repentir): A French
Perspective, 6 J. INTELL. PROP. L. & PRAC. 535, 535-541 (2011). See also, SEVERINE DUSOLLIER ET
AL., supra note 46, at 78; Rita Matulionyte, Empowering Authors via Fairer Copyright Contract Law,
42 University of New South Wales Law Journal 681, 700-1 (2019). Likewise, non-exercise rules have
been recently introduced into the European Union Directive regarding the term of protection for
copyright and other related rights. Although there is a slight difference between the “use-it-or-lose-it
rule” introduced into the European Union Directive and the one previously discussed, all in all, the
exercise of such provisions enables the author or her successors to revoke a grant, and therefore, could
be deemed a de facto right reversion. The Directive aims to strengthen the position of performers by
extending the term of protection, consequently granting them remuneration for longer periods. For that
reason, some changes and new provisions pertaining to the contractual relationship between performers
and recording producers have been introduced. Among those provisions, one can find Article 2(a), also
known as the new “use-it-or-lose-it rule.” See Council Directive 2011/77, 2011 O.J. (L 265) 2 (EU);
Estelle Derclaye, Ben Smulders, & Herman Cohen Jehoram, EU The European Union and Copyright,

195

NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

Unlike the U.S. and Canadian reversionary rights, these reversion
mechanisms are contingent on the transferee’s failure to exploit the work.
222 Nevertheless, they also enable the author to enter a new agreement or
exploit the work on her own following a reversion of the rights.223
An example of this form of right reversion can be found in the
German legislation. The German Copyright Act incorporates a specific
provision pertaining to an author’s right of revocation (the right to recall, or
“Rückrufsrecht”) for non-exercise relating to all categories except contracts
for film production.224 Article 41 states that the author may revoke a grant
of rights if the holder of an exclusive exploitation right fails to exercise the
right in a timely manner225 or does so insufficiently, thereby causing
damage to the legitimate interests of the author.226 The criteria for
insufficient or lack of exercise are not outlined in the statute; this is to be
determined on a case-by-case basis.227 It appears, however, that the purpose
of the contract and the practice in the relevant industry primarily
determines the sufficient degree of exercise.228 In any case, the right holder
must actively work to exploit the rights, and non-exercise is generally

in 1-EU INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE EU §4 (Paul Edward Geller ed., 2017).
Article 2(a) establishes a right of revocation under certain circumstances. That is, during the extension
term of protection, the artist may terminate the agreement—by which she transferred her rights in the
fixation of her performance to a phonogram producer—if the producer has failed to release the
recording physically (in sufficient quantities) or digitally. See Commission staff working document
accompanying the proposal for a Council directive amending Council Directive 2006/116/EC as
regards the term of protection of copyright and related rights—impact assessment on the legal and
economic situation of performers and record producers in the European Union, COM (2008) 464
(final) 26 (Jul. 7, 2008) http://eurlex.europa.eu/legalcontent/SV/ALL/?uri=CELEX:52008SC2287
[https://perma.cc/ED7U-VNMM]. See also, Christina Angelopoulos, Amended Directive Extends the
term of Protection for Performers and Sound Recordings, 11 GRUR INT’L 987 (2011).
222 Some scholars have argued that the U.S. termination rights are likewise “contingent
reversionary rights.” Robert A. Kreiss, Abandoning Copyrights to Try to Cut Off Termination Rights, 58
MO. L. REV 85 (1993).
223 SEVERINE DUSOLLIER ET AL., supra note 46, at 77; Kretschmer, supra note 159.
224 See Montagnani & Borghi, supra note 218, at 256.
225 For instance, the statue stipulates that a timely manner is two years after the grant or transfer of
the exploitation right, or, if the work is delivered later, two years after its delivery. See GERMAN
COPYRIGHT ACT, supra note 72, Article 41; ARTUR-AXEL WANDTKE & WINFRIED BULLINGER,
PRAXISKOMMENTAR ZUM URHEBERRRECHT, (Practitioner’s Commentary on Copyright Law), 20 (3d
ed., 2009) (Gr.).
226 See GERMAN COPYRIGHT ACT, supra note 72, Article 41(2).
227 CHRISTIAN VRANCKX, DER RÜCKRUF URHEBERRECHTLICHER NUTZUNGSRECHTE NACH §§41,
42 URHG UND SEIN EINFLUSS AUF DEN BESTAND VON LIZENZKETTEN [The Recall of Copyrights
According to §§41, 42 GERMAN COPYRIGHT ACT and its Influence on the Existence of License Chains]
70 (Verlag Dr. Kovač 2013) (Ger.).
228 Landgericht München I [LG München I] [Regional Court of Munich] Dec. 13, 2006,
GEWERBLICHER RECHTSSCHUTZ UND URHEBERRECHT, RECHTSPRECHUNGS-REPORT [GRUR-RR] 195
(197) 2007 (Ger.) (discussing sufficient use); WANDTKE & BULLINGER, supra note 225, at 13.
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presumed when the rightholder deploys less funds than objectively
necessary to realize the purpose of the contract.229 It is important to note
that the non-exercise must cause damage to the legitimate interests of the
author for the author to exercise a revocation pursuant to the Article 41.230
Still, the underlying aim is to protect the author from the consequences of
an unwise contract.231 In general, the legitimate interests of the author may
be legal or monetary in nature. However, most scholars have found them to
encompass either direct or indirect monetary rewards.232
The author’s right of revocation can be exercised only after she has
served the transferee notice of the intended revocation and gave her
additional time to sufficiently exercise this right of exploitation.233 The time
provided for the intermediary is likewise determined on a case-by-case
basis and influenced by industry practices.234 Despite that, the author is not
required to provide additional time when the transferee is unable or
unwilling to exercise the right, or if doing so would threaten her interests.235
More importantly, the author’s right of revocation for non-exercise is not
waivable in advance.236 Any contractual limitations on the exercise of the
author’s right of revocation are possible if the limitations cover only a short
period, up to five years.237 In other words, the author cannot contractually
waive her rights in advance, however, she may decide to renounce it,
however, after the right is vested. On the other hand, and unlike the
mechanisms previously discussed, the Act requires the author to indemnify
the person affected by the revocation “if and to the extent required by
equity.”238
The right of revocation does not apply if “the non-exercise or the
insufficient exercise of the right of use is predominantly due to

229

See GERMAN COPYRIGHT ACT, supra note 72, art. 41; WANDTKE & BULLINGER, supra note
225, at 12; Gruenberger & Dietz, supra note 84, at § 4[3][c][iii].
230 See GERMAN COPYRIGHT ACT, supra note 72, art. 41(1).
231 See Senftleben, supra note 80, at 422-32.
232 HARTWIG AHLBERG & HORST-PETER GÖTTING, BECK’SCHER ONLINE-KOMMENTAR
URHEBERRECHT [Beck’s Online Comment Copyright] Rn. 7 (14th ed. 2016) (Ger.).
233 See GERMAN COPYRIGHT ACT, supra note 72, art. 41(3).
234 Gruenberger & Dietz, supra note 84, at § 4.
235 The circumstances under which the author is not required to provide additional time are not
clear. See VRANCKX, supra note 227, at 86.
236 See GERMAN COPYRIGHT ACT, supra note 72, art. 34(5).
237 See GERMAN COPYRIGHT ACT, supra note 72, art. 90(1); see also Montagnani & Borghi, supra
note 218, at 256-57. The German Copyright Act also enables early termination for exploitation that is
contrary to the artist’s wishes. However, such termination is linked to the author’s moral rights rather
than to her economic interests. DUSOLLIER ET AL., supra note 46, at 77-78.
238 See GERMAN COPYRIGHT ACT, supra note 72, art. 41(6).
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circumstances which the author can be reasonably expected to remedy.”239
For instance, this is the case if there is a need to update or revise the work
due to new developments in the field, as in the case of scientific works.
However, this does not include alteration due to changes in public taste.240
In addition to the above-mentioned principles which are applicable to
most copyright contracts comprised in the Copyright Act, the German
Publishing Act prescribes specific arrangements that are implied in
publishing contracts. Inter alia, it empowers the author to rescind the
contract when the publisher fails to publish a new edition after an
appropriate term, or when the work is not exploited in the agreed upon
manner.241 The right to revoke publishing contracts for non-use is
associated with the legislative presumptions that: (1) authors usually
transfer their rights exclusively in publishing contracts; and (2) publishing
contracts are commonly constructed to the advantage of publishers.242
Hence, providing the author with a right to terminate the contract in the
event the publisher fails to carry out their obligations was intended to
counterbalance the power disposition towards publishers.243
In general, “[a]ll of the renewal, reversion, and termination provisions
of copyright stem from a desire to redistribute the capital asset of copyright
to the originator as a protective device against improvident assignments or
transfers.”244 In fact, such reversionary mechanisms make all transfers of
copyrights revocable by the author or her successors, and therefore, limit
the duration of rights enjoyed by the transferee. Hence, the initial
ownership of the author cannot be permanently and unconditionally
transferred.
In sum, the copyright schema demands that the author be a primary
beneficiary of the system. However, it is increasingly recognized that
simply providing the author with property rights is insufficient.
239

Id., art. 41(1).
See Gruenberger and Dietz, supra note 84, at § 4.
241 See Verlagsgesetz (VerlG) (Publishing Act), 1901, Sec. 17. See also, Gruenberger and Dietz,
supra note 84, at § 4[3][b][i]; DOROTHEE THUM, STATUTORY OR OTHER RULES REGARDING
REMUNERATION FOR AUTHORS AND PERFORMING ARTISTS, 1 COPYRIGHT THROUGHOUT THE WORLD
§ 16:32 (Silke von Lewinski ed., 2015).
242 See Montagnani & Borghi, supra note 218, at 255-56.
243 Id. Another noteworthy example with respect to publishing contracts is the French Intellectual
Property Code. Article L 132-17(2) of the French Intellectual Property Code explicitly provides that
“[t]he contract shall terminate automatically, if, upon formal notice by the author fixing a reasonable
period of time, the publisher has not affected publication of the work or, should the work be out of
print, its republication.” See FRENCH INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CODE, supra note 87, art. L132-17; See
also DUSOLLIER ET AL., supra note 46, at 41.
244 William Krasilovsky & Robert S. Meloni, Copyright Law as a Protection Against
Improvidence: Renewals, Reversions, and Terminations, 5 COMM. & L. 3, 5 (1983).
240
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Consequently, a wide variety of approaches to improve the bargaining
position of the author have emerged (i.e., ensuring a minimum level of
remuneration to authors ex ante, providing them with a right to ask for
modification of the compensation stipulated in the contract ex post, or
granting authors an inalienable right to regain control of their previously
transferred rights)
The table below provides a comprehensive overview of the various
“hard” legislative interventions:
Subcategory
Ex ante
Remuneration’s
determination

Ex post
adjustment
mechanisms

Specific
Measure
Equitable
remuneration
Proportional
remuneration
Minimum
royalty Rate
Success
clause

Resale
royalty rights

Reversionary
Interests

Reversion
Termination
Revocation
for nonexercise

Jurisdiction

Intended Beneficiary

Germany

Author

France

Author

Israel

Author

Germany,
France and
other
European
jurisdictions
Germany,
France and
other
jurisdictions
(including
California)
Canada
U.S.

Author

Germany

Visual artist

Author’s heirs
Authors (or their
statutory successors)
Author

The above categorization is by no means exhaustive. Yet, providing a
unifying perspective for classifying “hard intervention” into the authorintermediary contractual relationship draws attention to certain aspects of
the regulation that might have been overlooked. More importantly, this
categorization provides the framework for subsequent in-depth examination
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of the resulting distributional implications. These challenges and
distributional ramification will be further discussed in the next Part.
VI. RAMIFICATIONS OF “HARD” INTERVENTIONS?
The previous sections describe three categories of hard interventions
into author-intermediary contractual relationship. Although governments
adopt these legislative interventions with the best intentions in mind, we
must ask whether these interventions operated to advance the interest of
intended beneficiaries (i.e., authors), and if so, which group benefits from
those interventions, and under what conditions. Specially, whether authors
as a group benefit from those measures at the expense of the intermediaries,
or if there are differences among different groups of authors.
Recall our budding author from Part II. In our example the author’s
first novel that catches the eye of a major publishing house (i.e., an
intermediary). Now suppose that during the negotiation process, the author
agrees to transfer her rights into the hands of the publishing house for
certain periodic payments, or royalties, but the parties have not yet
concluded the contract. The legislature then passes copyright legislation
incorporating a minimum royalty rate provision. Of course, the minimum
royalty rate provision does not guarantee the author any compensation,
since the payments depend upon the actual success of the work in the
market. Nevertheless, let us assume the floor rate is higher than the rate on
which the parties would have agreed under free market conditions.
Inevitably, the introduction of the provision would increase the
intermediary’s costs. Now, the publishing house has to decide whether to
enter a contract with the author. If it chooses to contract with the author, all
else being equal, the intermediary will have to spend more money to
acquire the same rights. This means that the value of the contract decreases.
If it chooses not to contract, we have an otherwise viable transaction that
failed to materialize.
Now imagine that the legislature did not introduce the ex-ante
minimum royalty rate. Rather, shortly before the parties sign the contract,
the legislature implements a new ex-post author’s protectionist measure in
the form of an adjustment mechanism or reversionary rights. In this
scenario, too, the publishing house can choose either to contract or not to
contract. If the intermediary decides to contract, the adjustment mechanism
and the reversionary right will affect the desirability of the transaction,
because these measures deny the intermediary a share of the future profits.
If the publishing house decides not to contract, an otherwise viable
transaction fails to happen.
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As noted previously, contract adjustment mechanisms provide the
author with the right to retroactively demand an additional payment. The
goal is to reflect the proven value of the work regardless of the initial
compensation agreed upon between the parties. Thus, it could be very
rewarding for the author who happens to succeed only later in life.
However, for the intermediary, it makes the investment less attractive.
Reversionary mechanisms make all transfers of copyrights revocable by the
author or her successors, and therefore, limit the rights enjoyed by the
intermediary. When the term of the contract is shorter, the overall expected
value of the rights transferred to the intermediary decreases.245 In this case
too, the expected value of the transfer diminishes.246
One might be tempted to argue that reversionary rights are unlikely to
abate the intermediary’s expected returns since, at the point of reversion or
re-negotiation the vast majority of works is of little economic value.247
However, we must take into consideration that very few successful works
remain in demand and generate revenues for very long periods of time.
Even if the majority of works are indeed only in demand for a short period,
some successful works enjoy a much longer lifespan.248 The reversion of
these “bestselling” works will undoubtedly affect the intermediary’s
average expected returns. More than that, year after year, more authors will

245

Darling, supra note 22, at 165-67 (2014) (arguing that termination makes that initial assignment
of copyright less valuable to publishers, “decreasing the price they are willing to pay to authors
upfront”). Accord, Guy A. Rub, Stronger than Kryptonite: Inalienable Profit-Sharing Schemes in
Copyright Law, 27 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 49, 97-8 (2013).
246 Even more complicated is the situation in Canada, where the intermediary has no real way of
knowing how long he will be able to enjoy the rights transferred before the author passes away.
Reducing the term of transfer from life of the author plus fifty years to life of the author plus twentyfive years reduces the expectancy of future income. It is true that any transfer of copyright suffers from
similar uncertainty. The lifespan of copyrights in all jurisdictions is calculated based on the life of the
author. However, not knowing how long the contract will last before reversion rights will vest adds
another layer of uncertainty. See, e.g., Tarantino, supra note 194, at 12.
247 Rappaport argues that most copyrighted works enjoy very little value as they arrive at the end of
the copyright protection. See EDWARD RAPPAPORT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 98-144 E, COPYRIGHT
TERM
EXTENSION:
ESTIMATING
THE
ECONOMIC
VALUES
(1998),
http://www.policyarchive.org/handle/10207/bitstreams/510.pdf
[https://perma.cc/QN6A-38W8]
(discussing the issue of the long-tail hypothesis). Landes and Posner offer similar argument, claiming
that most copyright protection holds little to no value for the right holders at the end of the term of
protection (initial term). See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE
OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 37 (2003).
248 Take for example the rights for the comic book character, Superman. The character originated
in the 1930s, but continues to generate significant profits today. See, e.g., Siegel v. Warner Bros. Entm’t
Inc., 542 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1102 (C.D. Cal. 2008); DC Comics v. Pac. Pictures Corp., No. CV 10-3633
ODW (RZx), 2012 WL 4936588, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 17, 2012).

201

NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

exercise their rights and ask to regain control over their works; the
cumulative effect on the intermediary could become significant.249
Furthermore, it is reasonable to presume that by the time of
renegotiation, the intermediary will have already invested in the
production, promotion and dissemination of the work. This investment is
specific to a particular work and has little to no value once the author
invokes her reversionary rights. The only way the intermediary can hope to
recoup it is to continue the relationship with the author. 250 As a result, the
author has leverage that she can use to obtain more favorable terms and a
larger share of the surplus.251 In other words, the intermediary could expect
not only higher costs, but also lower long-term revenue.252
Having demonstrated how different modes of intervention are
expected to affect the value of the transaction for the intermediary, it is
important to consider how the intermediary will adjust its behavior in
response.253 If the intermediary is aware of the existence of hard
interventions, it is reasonable to assume it will result in adverse effects on:
(1) the intermediary’s initial willingness to pay; (2) the number of contracts
executed, and (3) the investment in each work.254 A large and growing body
of literature emphasizes how these effects are likely to cause inefficiencies
in the market to the extent that legislators want to foster more favorable

249 Ariel Bogle, A Law That Lets Authors Break Contract After 35 Years to Take Effect in January,
MERVILLE HOUSE (December 3, 2012), https://www.mhpbooks.com/a-law-that-lets-authors-breakcontract-after-35-years-to-take-effect-in-january/ [https://perma.cc/2HNZ-CU64].
250 Darling, supra note 22, at 165-166 (discussing the hold-up problem); Mark A. Lemley, Ex Ante
Versus Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual Property, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 129, 132-36 (2004).
251 Moral Rights, Termination Rights, Resale Royalty, and Copyright Term: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Property and the Internet of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th
Cong., 2d. Sess. (Jul. 15, 2014) (Testimony of Casey Rae, Vice President for Policy and Education,
Future of Music Coalition). Even when the author and the intermediary are unable to agree on the terms
of the new contract, the author is given a second chance for the work to be exploited (commercially or
non-commercially) either through a different intermediary or on her own. In fact, it is possible that the
author or a different intermediary will see a different avenue for the work. See Netanel, supra note 1, at
409-410. This can lead to a better use of resources since it is not hard to imagine a situation where the
author decides to dedicate the work to the public domain or distribute it for free after the intermediary
fails exploit it. See also, Kretschmer, supra note 159, at 50-51; H.R. REP. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d
Sess. 14 (1909).
252 Alternatively, the intermediary may reduce the investment or otherwise harm the success of the
work just before the time of reversion is up. This problem is particularly problematic when looking at
royalty contracts. See Darling, supra note 22, at 167; Rub, supra note 245, at 44.
253 Samuel W. Buell, Good Faith and Law Evasion, 58 UCLA L. REV. 611, 612 (2011).
254 Darling, supra note 22, at, at 162-168 (discussing US Termination rights); Kretschmer, supra
note 2, at 163; Henry Hansmann & Marina Santilli, Royalties for Artists versus Royalties for Authors
and Composers, 25 J. CULTURAL ECON. 258, 265 (2001) (discussing resale royalty rights); Stella
Brown, It Takes a Village to Make a Difference: Continuing the Spirit of Copyright, 12 NW. J. TECH. &
INTELL. PROP. 129, 147 (2014); Tarantino, supra note 194, at 1, 17-18.
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terms for authors. The distributional implications of those measures ought
to be explicitly considered.
A. Hard Interventions lead to Inter-Author Redistribution
The intermediary’s attempts to offset the effect of the introduction of
legislative interventions by reducing average compensation ex ante
inevitably leads to inter-author redistribution.255 It is easier to see this if one
proceeds from the reasonable assumption that authors are a largely
homogenous group with only few superstars whose works generate high
profits.256
In principle, the intermediary’s decreased willingness to pay should
adversely affect all authors. In reality, it is likely that this effect will be less
pronounced in the case of the small subsection of superstar authors. There
are several reasons for this. First, a superstar author who sells millions of
copies represents a more lucrative bargain for the intermediary relative to
unheard-of or less known authors.257 Mainly due to her proven record of
success. Practically, then, the successful author enjoys a relatively stronger
bargaining position that could help her fight off any attempt to lower her
remuneration. Moreover, if there are enough intermediaries vying for the
works of well-known authors, they will compete among themselves by
offering authors more attractive terms.258 This, in turn, ought to
counterbalance, at least to a certain degree, the decrease in intermediaries’
willingness to pay ex-ante.259 In contrast, new authors and those working
within a particular niche of the industry typically enjoy lower demand,
255

The term denotes redistribution of wealth among members of the group.
See Nicolas Suzor, Access, Progress, and Fairness: Rethinking Exclusivity in Copyright, 15
VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 297, 324 (2013) (claiming that the copyright system “provides extremely
high rewards to an extremely small proportion of creators who are able to win a lottery for attention”).
ROBERT H. FRANK & PHILIP J. COOK, THE WINNER-TAKE-ALL SOCIETY, 9 (1995) (“[B]ook publishing
is a lottery of the purest sort, with a handful of best-selling authors receiving more than $10 million per
book while armies of equally talented writers earn next to nothing.”); Darling, supra note 22, at 160.
257 See MARTIN KRETCHMER & PHILIP HARDWICK, AUTHORS’ EARNING FROM COPYRIGHT AND
NON-COPYRIGHT SOURCES: A SURVEY OF 25,000 BRITISH AND GERMAN WRITERS (Center for
Intellectual Property Policy & Management, 2007) (studying authors’ earning in the UK and Germany).
See also Zimmerman, supra note 3, at 38-42. But see Rub, supra note 245, at 81-82; Randall K.
Filer, The “Starving Artist”—Myth or Reality? Earnings of Artists in the United States, 94 J. POL.
ECON. 56, 59 (1986).
258 In contrast, in all likelihood, there is insufficient competition among intermediaries over the
works of new and unestablished authors. See for example studies indicating a high degree of
concentration in different markets. Michael Rushton, The Law and Economics of Artists’ Inalienable
Rights, 25 J. CULTURAL ECON. 243, 250 (2001); Michael Szenberg & Eric Youngkoo Lee, The
Structure of the American Book Publishing Industry, 18 J. CULTURAL ECON. 313, 314 (1994); Allen J.
Scott, A New Map of Hollywood: The Production and Distribution of American Motion Pictures, 36
REGIONAL STUD. 957. 959-60 (2002).
259 RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AND THE LAW, 116 (7th ed. 2007).
256
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giving them little choice but to submit to the intermediary’s lower price.
Hence, they will be more willing to accept lower payments in comparison
to well-known and established authors.
Second, although the threat of higher costs and lower revenues
initially reduces the compensation received by the author, in jurisdictions
with adjustment mechanisms and reversionary rights, the author or her
successors can potentially benefit from an additional share of the surplus ex
post.260 These ex post reassessments of the terms of compensation can
potentially correct the results of the initial lower compensation. Yet, this
would be useful only for a handful of authors.
For instance, adjustment mechanisms described earlier, provide the
author with a right to demand modification of the contract in case the
original agreement concerning remuneration does not reflect the actual
benefits derived from the exploitation of the work. Technically, this should
trigger further compensation whenever there is an imbalance between the
agreed remuneration and the actual revenues. But, in fact, this right to
demand adjustment is subject to thresholds requirements in the form of: (1)
minimum resale amount in the case of resale royalty rights; or, (2) a
conspicuous disparities requirement in the case of best-seller clauses. In
other words, the legislation requires that a certain level of success be
achieved as a precondition for effectuating the author’s rights. Studies
suggest that the threshold requirements will be satisfied only for a very
small fraction of authors.261
No such requirement exists for reversionary rights. Nevertheless,
given the long period between the initial contract and the time at which
reversion comes into play, the distributional effect of reversionary rights is
dependent to a great deal on the work remaining in-demand for several
decades. This is typically the case with only a small portion of all works.262
260

See supra Part III.b.
See EUROPE ECONOMICS, supra note 86, at 174-178. ARTIST’S RESALE RIGHT—SUMMARY OF
SURVEY FINDINGS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OFFICE, 1, (2015); Kathryn Graddy, Noah Horowitz, &
Stefan Szymanski, A Study Into The Effect On The UK Art Market Of The Introduction Of The Artist’s
Resale Right, 22-23 (2008), (“Auction house data indicate that during the period since its introduction,
80% of all ARR payments should have gone to the top 100 artists”) (UK artist’s resale right does not
apply to sales below 1,000 euros); U.K. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OFFICE, COMMENTS SUBMITTED IN
RESPONSE TO THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S CONSULTATION ON THE IMPLEMENTATION AND EFFECT
OF THE RESALE RIGHT DIRECTIVE 2001/84/EC (2011), (under “Contributions authorised for
publication”). See also, Ricketson, supra note 142, at 20. But see Anny Shaw, Will Artist Royalty
Rights Go Global?, ART NEWSPAPER (Aug. 28, 2015).
262 Indeed, several studies demonstrate that only a small percentage of all works remain in demand
and available long after creation. See Mulligan & Schultz, supra note 159, at 460-62 (concluding that
only 2.3% of in-copyright books and 6.8% of in-copyright films released pre-1946 remained
commercially available in 2002.); LANDES & POSNER, supra note 247, at 212 (claiming that of 10,027
books published in the USA in 1930, only 174 (1.7%) were still in print in 2001). Stan J. Liebowitz &
261
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To see how ex-post legislative interventions generate inter-author
redistribution of wealth, let’s first look at the right of revocation for nonexercise. 263 The statutory duties to exploit, taken together with the author’s
right to terminate the contract under the use-it-or-lose it provision, can
force the intermediary to draft the contract more narrowly, encompassing
only those rights that one genuinely expects or intends to exploit.264 This
may work for the benefit of the author, as it reduces the number and scope
of the rights transferred.265But, the threat of revocation can potentially
impose additional costs on the intermediary, which will be rolled over to
the authors either in the form of lower compensation to all authors or fewer
transactions. In other words, the intermediary will adjust her behavior to
reflect the risks associated the obligation to exploit the work.
As an illustration, imagine a publisher holding the rights to a book
written a few years ago. Theoretically, in the absence of an obligation to
use the rights to the book within a set time period, the publisher can hold
the rights for a very long time while waiting to publish until some event
occurs. The book may be out of print, sitting in a back-catalogue, or
alternatively, it might remain unexploited. However, in the presence of
“use-it-or-lose-it” rule, the intermediary will need to use the rights within
the statutory set period or lose them altogether.266 The publisher can no
longer wait. Rather, he must disseminate the work within the period stated
in the legislation, or risk losing the rights. The choice to forgo the rights
will not entail additional costs, but may affect future income.267 The choice
to publish the work on the other hand will entail additional costs, and
therefore, will reduce the expected value on average. Furthermore, in the
Stephen Margolis, Seventeen Famous Economists Weigh in on Copyright: The Role of Theory,
Empirics, and Network Effects, 18 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 435, 455 (2005) (showing that 41% of all books
remained in print fifty-eight years after their initial publication); Peter DiCola, Money from Music:
Survey Evidence on Musicians’ Revenue and Lessons About Copyright Incentives,55 ARIZ. L. REV. 301
(2013).
263 Though unlike the U.S.’s termination rights and Canadian reversionary rights, European rights
of revocation for non-exercise rules are contingent on the intermediary failure to exploit the work
sufficiently in a timely manner. See Kreiss, supra note 222; See DUSOLLIER ET AL., supra note 46, at
77; See Kretschmer, supra note 160. All these rules give rise to similar undesirable distributive effects.
264 Cf. Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, More is not Always Better than Less: An Exploration in Property
Law, 92 MINN. L. REV. 634 (2008). (arguing that “extreme measures are less subject to inefficiencies
and more likely to be a product of careful thought, and that moderate measures can be indicative of
distributive errors that require correction”).
265 If the scope of transfer is too broad and the intermediary does not make use of the right, it can
deprive the author of income and of the opportunity to contract with a different intermediary who can
make better use of it. DUSOLLIER ET AL., supra note 46, at 72; GUIBAULT & HUGENHOLTZ, supra note
121, at 31.
266 Id., at 49-50.
267 This is true whether it is a buy-out or a royalty-based contract because by the time of
revocation, the publisher has some sunk costs.
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case of revocation for non-exploitation, the works are, presumably, of
lesser value to the intermediary. At the same time, it is questionable
whether the reversion will provide any real financial advantages for the
majority of authors. Authors without a proven track record will have a
difficult time finding an intermediary willing to take on the risk and
expenses necessary to distribute a work in low demand.
An ex-post intervention, in other words, is like a lottery ticket, that
provides all authors a small chance to obtain a huge reward in the future.
However, unlike the lottery, all authors are forced to participate. The
winners are those authors lucky enough to create a successful work, which
means they will be generously compensated in the future. The losers, on
the other hand, are those authors who were forced to suffer decline in the
initial payment and were destined to remain under-compensated.268 In such
a market dynamic, the majority of authors finances the ex post additional
compensation derived by the fortunate few.
Simply said, hard interventions create inter-author subsidization.269
Cross-subsidies are widely exercised in the market, and they are not per se
“undesirable”.270 In actuality, in the copyright realm, most intermediaries
adopt a cross-subsidy policy. They use revenues derived from successful
and profitable works to recoup the costs from other unsuccessful authors.271
That said, as Ben-Shahar points out, cross or internal subsidies “should be
particularly troubling when they are regressive—when weaker and poorer
consumers subsidize the sophisticated and wealthier ones.”272
Moreover, only a small fraction of all works become successful and
generate long-term demand.273 This being the case, hard interventions also
268 In spite of that, authors tend to be overly optimistic and overestimate the likelihood that their
work will be successful. This so-called “lottery effect” leads authors to gamble for the chance to win the
jackpot. This may incentivize creation in the first place. Zimmerman, supra note 3, at 30.
269 Oren Bar Gill & Omri Ben-Shahar, Regulatory Techniques in Consumer Protection: A Critique
of European Consumer Contract Law, 50 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 109, 119 (2013) (discussing crosssubsidies in the context of consumer law protection measures); Guy Pessach, Copyright Law as a
Silencing Restriction on Noninfringing Materials: Unveiling the Scope of Copyright’s Diversity
Externalities, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 1067, 1097-98 (2003) (discussing the cross-subsidy argument in the
context of corporate media and calls for broad copyright protection).
270 See generally Jacob Nussim, To Confuse and Protect: Taxes and Consumer Protection, 1
COLUM. J. TAX L. 218, 245 (2010) (arguing that “Numerous cross-subsidies among individuals exist in
the market, and most are not necessarily considered socially undesirable to an extent that requires
regulatory intervention.”)
271 Paul Goldstein, Copyright, 55 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 79, 83 (1992).
272 Omri Ben-Shahar, Regulation Through Boilerplate: An Apologia, 112 MICH. L. REV. 883, 901
(2014).
273 In fact, a study conducted in 2007 found that royalties’ contracts are extremely uncertain
sources of income. KRETSCHMER & HARDWICK, supra note 257, at 3 (arguing that “The rewards to
best-selling writers are indeed high but as a profession, writing has remained resolutely
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appear undesirable in terms of reallocation of risk. Authors and
intermediaries typically have different disposition to risk. As noted in the
previous chapters, it is common for the author to transfer the risk of failure
or success to the party in a better position to assume the risk (i.e., the
intermediary).274 Hard interventions preclude the author from transferring
the whole risk. This pays off only for successful authors.
Notwithstanding this, it is essential to recognize that in countries in
which the legislature implements an ex-ante intervention in the form of
minimum royalty rate (i.e., de jure or de facto), the measure operates
somewhat like a safety net. Assuming the rate adopted in the legislation is
higher than what the parties would have bargained for under the terms of
the free market, authors other than superstars could possibly be better off
under the new rule than under the terms of the free market. No doubt, this
effect will differ across jurisdictions with diverse minimum rate
requirements. Nevertheless, ideally the introduction of remuneration floor
would redistribute wealth and buttress the bottom ranks.275
However, the positive impact of minimum royalty is limited, since
legislative interventions also induce the intermediary to reduce its
investment in “riskier” transactions, which will lead to a decline in the
number transactions.276 Fewer transactions mean that fewer authors will be
able to benefit from the services of intermediaries.277 This means that new
and aspiring authors, as well as those working in less popular fields, will be
harmed.
The reason is straightforward: in markets where transactions are
characterized by a high degree of uncertainty, contracting parties often use
contracts to shift risk. In fact, it is common for the author to transfer the
risk of failure or success to the hands of the party that is in a better position
to assume the risk (i.e., the intermediary). The intermediary is likely to be
risk-neutral, because it can spread his risk over a large portfolio of works.278
unprosperous.”). See also KRETSCHMER ET AL., supra note 19; Glenton Davis, When Copyright is Not
Enough: Deconstructing Why, as the Modern Music Industry Takes, Musicians Continue to Make, 16
CHI. -KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 373 (2017); Watt, supra note 11, at 12.
274 See also Kretschmer, supra note 2, at 160-162.
275 For a general discussion of the labor demand-induced impact of minimum wages see, e.g.,
Pierre Cahuc & Philippe Michel, Minimum Wage Unemployment and Growth, 40 EUR. ECON. REV.
1463 (1996).
276 Marcowitz-Bitton and Nussim analyze the Israeli minimum royalty rate and argue that although
setting a higher price than what would have been set by the market creates an excessive supply, the
demand is lower than what we would see under free market conditions (i.e., lower price). MarcowitzBitton & Nussim, supra note 103, at 278-79.
277 Darling, supra note 20.
278 This assumption of risk-neutrality can be challenged. Nevertheless, I believe it is tenable as a
general framework for this discussion.
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Where the legislative intervention creates a decline in the expected value,
the intermediary may strive to reduce his investment in “riskier” works.
It is almost impossible to predict in advance which work will turn out
to be a success. As a result, intermediaries must rely on market signals such
as the demand for certain genres of works and the author’s reputation. In
this respect, more well-established and known authors are likely to
represent lower levels of uncertainty and risk of failure.279 Conversely,
unestablished authors with works appealing to a very specific segment of
the population represent a much higher risk. Hence, it is to be expected that
the intermediaries will tend to invest in what they perceive as the “likely
winner,” while shying away from upstart authors and those who produce
works with lower appeal to the masses.280
A potential drawback of minimum royalty rate, as well as of all other
forms of hard interventions derives from the fact that the intermediary’s
incentives for cost reduction may lead it to cut back on the number of
transactions.281 For instance, consider what happened in the Israeli book
market following introduction of a mandatory minimum royalty rate.282 The
annual report on the state of the book industry, submitted by the advisory
committee to the Minister of Culture and Sport, the Minister of Economy
and the Knesset Education, Culture and Sport Committee, indicated that
data from selected publishers reveal that during the year following the
enactment of the law, there has been an average 21% decline in the number
of debut books.283 One should note that the Israeli legislature attempted to
reduce the risk undertaken by the intermediary and incentivize it to enter
into contractual relationships with first time authors by allowing
intermediaries to reduce the royalties’ rate payable to first time authors by
no more than 20% relative to all other authors.284 Nevertheless, the abovementioned data reveal that, for the most part, this was a futile attempt.

279

See supra Part II.
Marcowitz-Bitton & Nussim, supra note 103, at 284-86. This fits well into copyright’s winnertake-all dynamic. See, e.g., Davis, supra note 273, at 384-85; FRANK & COOK, supra note 256; see also
Ruth Towse, Copyright and Artists: A View from Cultural Economics, 20 J. ECON. SURVS. 567, 578
(2006) (describing the “winner-takes-all” aspects of the art labor market).
281 See, e.g., Rub, supra note 245, at 82-84 (discussing termination rights); Darling supra note 20
(discussing termination rights); John L. Solow, An Economic Analysis of the Droit De Suite, 22 J.
CULTURAL ECON. 209 (1998) (discussing resale royalty rights); Marcowitz-Bitton & Nussim, supra
note 103, at 286-87 (discussing Israeli minimum royalty rate arrangements).
282 See Law for the Protection of Literature, supra note 63.
283 The report also indicated an increase in the number of self-published books, making it seem that
writers rejected by the large publishing houses are not desperate and find alternative ways to finance the
publication of their books. See Annual Report on the State of the Book Industry, supra note 117, at 16.
284 Law for the Protection of Literature, supra note 63, §3(c).
280
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What happened in the Israeli book market corresponds, at least to
some degree, to the standard law and economics analysis of minimum
wage legislation, which predicts that mandatory minimum wages lead to
lower earnings in underground sectors, fewer jobs, and higher
unemployment rates, for low-skilled workers.
Though, in recent years, some scholars have called into question these
predictions, indicating that although minimum wage legislation is one of
the most studied topics, empirical results as to its impact on employment
remain inconclusive.285 It bears emphasis that minimum wage policy and
mandatory minimum royalty’s rate regulation discussed throughout this
paper286 are categorically different. Hence, it would be a mistake to treat
them as interchangeable. There are numerous institutions, norms, and other
features of the labor market that do not apply to the market for copyrighted
works. For example, the minimum royalty rate is determined on a
percentage basis and, more importantly, it does not guarantee authors any
minimum compensation (unlike minimum wage arrangements).287
Nevertheless, even if one accepts the conclusion derived from scholarly
studies that indicates minimum wage does not bring about unemployment,
it does not undermine the conclusion that hard interventions will lead to
inter-author redistribution. At best, a disproportionately large segment of
authors will be subsidizing authors at the top and bottom tiers. At worst,
minimum royalty rates will strengthen the most successful authors and
prevent many of the lower tier from transacting with intermediaries.
In sum, inter-author redistribution generates a disproportionate
skewing to the detriment of new, less-known, inexperienced and mostvulnerable authors.
B. Hard Interventions Induce Re-distribution of Wealth Over-Time
Hard interventions not only affect inter-author distribution, but they
also change the distribution of wealth over time for each individual author
they effect. That is, they impact the redistribution of wealth from the author
at present to her future self.
285 Some studies found small negative employment effects of minimum wage legislation. Others
found no effect on employment while the last group found small positive effects. See David Card &
Alan B. Krueger, Minimum Wages and Employments: A Case Study of the Fast-Food Industry in New
Jersey and Pennsylvania, 84 AM. ECON. REV. 772 (1994); David Card, Do Minimum Wages Reduce
Employment: A Case Study of California, 46 INDUS. & AND LAB. REL. REV. 38 (1992). See also,
Marcowitz-Bitton & Nussim, supra note 103, at 279-84.
286 See supra Part III.a.
287 Marcowitz-Bitton and Nussim acknowledge these differences and argue that they do not change
the economic analysis. Therefore, we should expect a minimum royalty rate to harm some first-time or
riskier authors. Marcowitz-Bitton & Nussim, supra note 103, at 284.
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Ex post interventions in the form of adjustment mechanisms and
reversionary rights bring about an initial payment decrease with a promise
of additional compensation in the future. Consequently, for a select few,
immediate losses are to be corrected by deferred future gains. For example,
as previously stated, under the U.S. Copyright Act the author could regain
control of rights previously transferred.288 However, she must wait at least
thirty-five years before terminating the transfer and getting back the
rights.289 Hence, even when a work remains in demand many years after the
initial transfer when the reversion can be triggered, the fact remains that the
author is substituting a payment in the present for the prospect of a
payment in the future. In this scenario, gains may be realized after a
decades-long delay amid considerable uncertainty.
Less robust is the distributional effect over time of measures
controlling the form of remuneration ex-ante. For instance, all things being
equal, both France and Israel explicitly prohibit buy-out contracts.290 The
German legislation takes a slightly less intrusive approach, allowing for
buy-out contracts, but firmly encouraging the parties to avoid them.291 The
idea is that royalties-based transactions are more favorable to the author for
the following reasons: (1) the author is compensated throughout the
exploitation of the work; (2) she is associated with the success of her work;
and, (3) it safeguards the author from giving up all her rights for a
relatively small payment.292 In this respect, a royalties-based contract could
potentially improve the financial position of the author in comparison to a
lump-sum,293 but it would come at the cost of a delayed payment.
The problem of a delayed payment is that the present value of any
future income streams is minuscule, due to inflation and the economic
principle of time value of money.294 This is of course, assuming that the

288

17 U.S.C. §§ 203(a), 304(c)-(d) (2002).
Id.
290 See supra Part III describing the notion of the right to proportionate remuneration and
mandatory minimum royalty rate.
291 See supra notes 76-86 and accompanying text.
292 Although in practice, this can be less favorable to the author. The amount due to the author in
case of a royalties-based contract is contingent on the success of the work.
293 This taps into the vast literature discussing individual preferences and paternalism, because the
legislature assumes her preferences at the time the contract is concluded do not consist with her longterm best interests. See generally, Paul Burrows, Patronising Paternalism, 45 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS
542, 563-64 (1993); Zamir & Medina emphasize that legal norms can change people’s preferences;
EYAL ZAMIR & BARAK MEDINA, LAW, ECONOMICS AND MORALITY 323 (2010).
294 In essence, the time value of money means that a dollar today is worth more than a dollar
sometime in the future. In this regard, important to note that the higher the interest rate and the further
out into the future one goes, the less the dollar is worth. Richard Posner, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE
LAW 46-47 (5th ed. 1998) (“As a result of discounting to present value, the knowledge that you may be
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future income is certain. When the future income is uncertain, this is
another reason to prefer payment here and now.
Additionally, the delay in payment created by hard interventions seem
undesirable, since most professional authors begin their careers when they
are young and often struggle to make a living.295 At that point in time, an
author is likely to be particularly risk averse and more dependent on
immediate income to survive.296 In theory, a risk-neutral person will be
indifferent between future and immediate payments if the two have an
equal expected value. In contrast, a risk-averse person will prefer a certain
immediate payoff over uncertain higher payments later.297 And so, forcing
the risk-averse author to give up an immediate payment for a potential
future payment will adversely affect her wellbeing.
A different distributional issue raised by the delay in earning is the
fact that in many situations, future payments will flow to the hands of the
author’s successors. For instance, in the case of reversionary rights, the
author’s successors are not only entitled to claim the reversionary rights,
but in many cases, the right will vest with them from the start.298 This is the
case in Canada, where reversion is possible only after the death of the
author.299 In the United States, although the reversion or rights is not
contingent on the death of the author, but often will vest only after the
author has passed away.300 Under both schemes, therefore, the reversionary
rights not only redistribute the wealth across time, but also from the author
to her successors.
The case is further complicated, as the U.S. Copyright Act that clearly
states that if the author dies before the vesting of termination rights, the
rights pass to her family members (i.e., the surviving spouse, children or

entitled to a royalty on your book 50 to 100 years after you publish it is unlikely to affect your behavior
today.”); Robert C. Denicola, Freedom to Copy, 108 YALE L.J. 1661, 1679 (1999).
295 Rub, supra note 7, at 104-105.
296 Id. at 83-84. Not all individuals are of course equally loss averse, However, I assume that
authors are, in general, loss averse.
297 A risk-averse individual values money less as he or she accumulate more. See, e.g., Charles A.
Holt & Susan K. Laury, Risk Aversion and Incentive Effects, 92 AM. ECON. REV. 1644, 1662-63 (2002).
298 The legislative history indicates that the legislators wanted to ensure the author’s family and
dependents would be able to benefit from such reversionary rights. See Katie Joseph, Copyright’s
Unconsidered Assumption: Statutory Successors to the Termination Interest (and the Unintended
Consequences for Estate Planners), 94 NEB. L. REV. 441, 455 (2015).
299 Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-42 §14 (1985). See generally, supra notes 190-198 and
accompanying text.
300 In numerous cases, grants made by the author while still alive will be subject to termination
after her death. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 203(a)(2).
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grandchildren).301 The surviving spouse is entitled to one-half of the
interest, and the surviving children then can take equal shares.302 The
grandchildren are entitled to the shares of their deceased parents. If there
are no surviving children or grandchildren, the surviving spouse will
receive the entire interest.303 This means that the termination interest may
vest in the successors delineated in the Copyright Act, rather than the
author’s intended beneficiary who may or may not be a member of the
group of successors, despite any contrary assignment, and even if the will
of the author denies them these rights.304 Hence, the reversionary rights not
only redistribute the wealth from the author to her heirs, but in the case of
the U.S., they can even redistribute it from the authors’ heirs by will to the
statutory successors. As Crawford and Gans put it, this makes it “difficult,
if not impossible, for authors to engage in effective estate planning.”305 Less
obvious but plausible is the redistribution over time and in favor of
successors in the case of adjustment mechanisms. Given that the
commercial lifespan of the majority of copyrighted works is very short, it is
likely that the author will be the one to demand an adjustment of
compensation if the work generates disproportionate proceeds.
Nevertheless, in certain scenarios, the value of the work is revealed long
after its creation. This is the case for many works of visual arts, which
spike in value once the artist passes away and can no longer create.306 In
those scenarios, the advantage of an adjustment mechanism is negligible
since future payments will flow to the hands of the artist’s successors “307 A
study prepared for the British Art Market Federation by Arts Economics

301 See 17 U.S.C. §§ 203(a)(2), 304(c)(2) (2006). See also, Bobby Rosenbloum, A Very Welcome
Return: Copyright Reversion and Termination of Copyright Assignments in the Music Industry, 17 ENT.
& SPORTS L. 3, 7 (1989).
302 See 17 U.S.C. §§ 203(a)(2), 304(c)(2) (2006).
303 See Id.
304 Joseph, supra note 298, at 444. Cf., Tarantino, supra note 194, at 18.
305 Bridget J. Crawford & Mitchell M. Gans, Sticky Copyrights: Discriminatory Tax Restraints on
the Transfer of Intellectual Property, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 25, 73 (2010).
306 See Ricketson, supra note 142, at 12; Maryam Dilmaghani & Jim Engle-Warnick, The
Efficiency of Droit de Suite: An Experimental Assessment, 9 REV. OF ECON. RES. ON COPYRIGHT
ISSUES 93, 116-118 (2012).
307 Incidentally, the European Coalition of Art Market Organization, in its submission to the
European Commission’s consultation on the implementation and effects of the EU Artist Resale Right
(ARR) Directive, indicates that, “[f]ewer than 3 out of every 100 living artists benefit from the right in
the EU and the bulk of the payments go to the heirs of a few famous deceased artists.” The European
Coalition of Art Market Organisations, Submission to the European Commission’s Consultation on the
Implementation and Effects of the EU Artist Resale Right (ARR) Directive (2001/84/EC) (March
2011),
https://www.copyright.gov/docs/resaleroyalty/comments/77fr58175/European_Coalition_of_Art_Mark
et_Organisations.pdf [https://perma.cc/R7JU-NTVR].
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found that resale royalty rights benefited only 1% of living British artists in
2013.308 Clearly, these efforts are failing to create the intended outcome for
the majority of artists.
C. Further Considerations
One important factor that is not considered in the hitherto discussion
is that the intermediary could attempt to counterbalance the effect of hard
interventions by raising the price. This would shift additional costs into the
hands of consumers in the form of higher prices. But unless consumers are
not price sensitive at all, a price increase will affect consumer demand.
Intuitively, it appears as if the demand for most copyrighted works is price
elastic. If this is in fact the case, it is critical for the effects of hard
interventions. Simply put, price sensitive demand will make it hard for the
intermediary to pass on costs. To date, only a limited number of studies
have attempted to estimate how an increase in price will affect the
consumer’s willingness to pay for copyrighted works. For example, in one
study, Rihgstad and Loyland examined the demand for books in Norway. 309
Based on survey data for more than 18,000 households from the period
1986-1999, Rihgstad and Loyland conclude that books are price sensitive
and that they are close substitutes to other cultural goods.310 Other scholars
report similar effects in the Danish and German book markets.311
No doubt, price elasticity certainly varies across industries and among
authors. Generally, however, where the demand is elastic, the intermediary
will be unable to transfer the full increase in costs to consumers, and
therefore, will have to either bear some of it or pass it to authors (i.e.,
decrease the initial remuneration and number of transactions). Here, too,
most of the burden falls, not on “superstar” authors, but on all the others,
for all the reasons stipulated above, as well as because the demand for

308 CLARE MCANDREW, THE EU DIRECTIVE ON ARR AND THE BRITISH ART MARKET, STUDY
PREPARED FOR THE BRITISH ART MARKET FEDERATION BY ARTS ECONOMICS, (Sep. 2014),
http://tbamf.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/ARR-Sector-Report-UK-2014.pdf.
[https://perma.cc/L5JF-BFNV].
309 Vidar Ringstad and Knut Løyland, The Demand for Books Estimated by Means of Consumer
Survey Data, 10 J. CULTURAL ECON 141 (2006).
310 Id.
311 See Chr. Hjorth-Anderson, A Model of the Danish Book Market, 24 J. CULTURAL ECON 27
(2000) (concluding that the demand for books is price sensitive.); George Bittlingmayer, The Elasticity
of Demand for Books, Resale Price Maintenance and the Lerner Index, 48 J. INST. & THEORETICAL
ECON. 588 (1992) (finding that increasing the price of a particular title reduced the demand for that very
same title).
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works of established and well-known authors are not as likely to be
sensitive to price changes as the works of less known author.312
Other elements might prevent the realization of the legislative aim of
wealth redistributing from intermediaries to authors. First, many of the hard
interventions require the author to invest time, effort, and resources to
enjoy them. For instance, gathering information necessary to support a
claim for inequitable remuneration or asking for a modification of the
contract. However, the author may lack the necessary financial means and
wherewithal to do so. Hard interventions are therefore of limited use to
certain authors.313
Second, the author and her successors may simply be unaware of their
rights, or not understand the legal procedure necessary to realize them. For
instance, for the author to terminate her rights, Section 203 and 304 of the
U.S. Copyright Act require the author to file a notice within a certain
timeframe, or else she might lose her right.314
Third, authors may be hesitant to initiate legal proceedings. They
might want to avoid being labeled as troublemakers and damage their
reputations, let alone, their relationship with their intermediaries.315 After
all, there are only so many relevant publishers in niche industries. Thus,
authors will be unlikely to seek adjustment or other judicial interventions.
In sum, regardless of the specific legislative language or approach
taken, hard interventions will be largely ineffective in improving the
financial situation of all authors. When legislatures coerce different parties
into entering into a royalty-based contract where a certain minimum royalty
rate exists, aside from the select group of well-known authors, two other
312 Although, works of creativity are unique, they do have similar characteristics and are therefore
interchangeable to a certain degree. The extent to which this interchangeability will affect the consumer
willingness to pay for a particular work will vary. See Rub, supra note 7, at 89.
313 EUROPEAN COPYRIGHT SOCIETY, GENERAL OPINION ON THE EU COPYRIGHT REFORM
PACKAGE (Jan. 24, 2017),
https://europeancopyrightsocietydotorg.files.wordpress.com/2015/12/ecs-opinion-on-eu-copyrightreform-def.pdf [https://perma.cc/LEQ5-K979].
314 Siegel v. Warner Bros. Entm’t Inc., 690 F. Supp. 2d 1048, 1057-58 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (stating
that “by not making termination automatic and requiring authors to jump through hoops even more
formidable than those renewal presented” under the 1909 Act, the consequence is that, “in practice, the
termination right has” been “barely used,” with “approximately 0.72% of [termination] transfers
hav[ing] been recorded, as required, with the Copyright Office” (citing William F. Patry, The Failure of
the American Copyright System: Protecting the Idle Rich, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 907, 922 (1997));
Emily Burrows, Termination of Sound Recording Copyrights & The Potential Unconscionability of
Work for Hire Clauses, 30 REV. LITIG. 101, 107 (2010); Joshua Beldner, Charlie Daniels And “The
Devil” In The Details: What The Copyright Office’s Response To The Termination Gap Foreshadows
About The Upcoming Statutory Termination Period, 18 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 199, 204 (2012)
(discussing this information gap in the context of the termination gap).
315 See SEVERINE DUSOLLIER ET AL., supra note 46, at 40.
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distinct groups of authors potentially stand to benefit financially. The first
are authors who would have bargained for a lower remuneration than that
set by the legislation. Admittedly though, there will be fewer transactions.
Nevertheless, the authors on the lower end who are fortunate enough to get
a contract will enjoy a higher remuneration rate. The second group are
novice authors, especially those who later turn out to be successful. For
these authors, a royalty-based contract could plausibly yield higher
payments since these ex-post mechanisms enable them to receive additional
compensation proportional to the works’ revenues once the real value
becomes known. Reversionary rights operate in a similar manner.
Regardless, these instruments are likely to benefit fewer authors on account
of the long time it takes for the rights to vest.
The exception to this observation is the “use-it-or-lose-it” rules that
could help certain authors secure alternative means of distribution for their
works and therefore additional revenues. However, any positive effect on
the author’s financial status is limited as authors may exercise their rights
only once the intermediary fails to fulfil its obligations.
As aforementioned, the ones who potentially gain from these
interventions are the group of well-known, best-selling authors. These
authors enjoy a strong bargaining position and are therefore less likely to
suffer from lower initial compensation in the first place. Nevertheless, they
would benefit from the ex-post measures (i.e., adjustments and reversions),
once again reiterating that while not all authors benefit from the
introduction of the host of legislative interventions discussed in this
research, a select few do.
VII.

CONCLUSIONS

In an effort to protect the authors’ wellbeing in their contractual
dealings, legislatures from around the world are increasingly keen to adopt
regulatory measures that limit the menu of options the parties can adopt
contractually. Specifically, these instruments endeavor to offset author’s
weak bargaining position either by ensuring a minimum level of
remuneration to authors’ ex-ante or providing them with an inalienable
right to ask for a modification of the compensation stipulated in the
contract ex-post or by granting them an inalienable right to regain control
of their previously transferred rights.
This host of legislative interventions is seemingly based on the
assumption that regulating author-intermediary transactions ex ante and ex
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post will invariably improve the financial situation of authors as a whole.
This assumption has been proven to be false.316
The ex ante and ex post measures yield a redistribution of wealth
among the author groups, but not in the way the legislature originally
envisioned. Specifically, hard interventions are expected to result in a
redistribution of wealth that favors a select group at the expense of a much
larger group of authors (i.e., inter-author redistribution), and a
redistribution of wealth from the author’s younger self, when she is more
likely to be under financial constraint, towards her older self (or her
successors). Finally, in most instances, the author will not even be the one
to receive the additional compensation; the compensation will instead be
passed on to the author’s statutory successors. In many cases, it is nothing
more than “too little, too late.”317
Overall then, hard interventions are ineffective in promoting the
interests of authors as a whole. These insights are significant not only for
academic purposes, but also for practical ones. After all, copyright
contracts are the building blocks of many creative industries. They also
form the framework by which the author, a symbol and an intended
beneficiary of the copyright system, secures remuneration.318
This paper does not claim that the findings by themselves justify an
objection to intervention, nor does it categorically oppose all government
initiatives designed to benefit authors. Further empirical research is needed
before any strong conclusions may be drawn. Nevertheless, the results
outlined in this paper should make policymakers doubtful as to the efficacy
and desirability of legislative interventions.

316

This is assuming a zero-sum game where one party must lose for the other party to win.
HUGH LADDIE, PETER PRESCOTT AND MARY VITORIA, THE MODERN LAW OF COPYRIGHT AND
DESIGNS, 882-884 (Butterworths, 3rd ed., 2000).
318 But see GINSBURG, supra note 9, at 62-63.
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